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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The treatment of international parallel proceedings remains
one of the most unsettled areas of the law of federal jurisdiction in
the United States. There is no consensus in U.S. federal courts as to
the appropriate legal framework for addressing cases involving
truly parallel, concurrent proceedings in the courts of a foreign
country.' This is true whether the court is asked to issue an antisuit injunction or asked to stay or dismiss its own proceedings in
deference to the pending foreign action. Given that the Supreme
Court has never spoken to the appropriate framework to be employed in parallel proceedings of cases involving the courts of foreign countries, it may be unsurprising that the federal courts are
divided in their approaches. What is surprising, however, is that
while the academic literature has paid considerable attention to the
problem of anti-suit injunctions in international cases (i.e., cases in
which a party asks a foreign court to enjoin a parallel proceeding in
a U.S. court), 2 scant attention has been paid to the alternative
course available to a domestic court: the stay or dismissal of its
own proceedings. Instead, the majority of the articles that have
been written on the topic have merely chronicled the divergent approaches taken by federal courts in the stay/dismissal context;
there has been almost no effort in these articles to propose a consti-

I See infra Section 3.
2 See, e.g., Kent Anderson, What Can the United States Learn from English AntiSuit Injunctions? An American Perspective on Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, 25 YALE
J. INT'L L. 195, 197 (2000) (arguing that the United States should fully commit to a
strict comity-based standard); Steven R. Swanson, The Vexatiousness of a Vexation
Rule: InternationalComity and Antisuit Injunctions, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
1, 2 (1996) (arguing that a "restrictive approach [to anisuit injunction cases] better
reflects significant needs of both the United States and the international system").
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tutional framework to allow the federal courts to deal with these
3
cases.
Notably, there has been considerable ink spilled on the question
of whether the federal courts possess the constitutional power to
limit or decline jurisdiction in deference to pending proceedings in
U.S. state courts. 4 However, to the extent that these discussions
have considered internationalparallel proceedings, they have done
so only tangentially, assuming, it seems, that what is appropriate
in the domestic federal-state context is appropriate in the international context as well. Consequently, this scholarship has tended
3 See, e.g., Louis F. Del Duca & George A. Zaphiriou, Rules for Declining to Exercise Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters: Forum Non Conveniens, Lis
Pendens, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 245 (1994) (analyzing the difficulties arising when
courts in different territories assume jurisdiction over the same matter); Louise
Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of ParallelProceedingsand Enforcement of
ForeignJudgments in TransnationalLitigation, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2004)
(discussing alternatives to parallel proceedings); Margarita Trevihio de Coale, Stay,
Dismiss, Enjoin, or Abstain?: A Survey of Foreign Parallel Litigation in the Federal
Courts of the United States, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 79 (1999) (reviewing cases involving
international parallel litigation). Notably, a number of articles have addressed the
question from the perspective of the U.S. government as a whole, rather than from
the perspective of the U.S. courts alone. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Comparative
Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague Convention on Jurisdictionand Judgments, 37
TEX. INT'L L.J. 467 (2002) (discussing forum non conveniens in transnational litigation); Teitz, supra. Specifically, these articles have proposed that the United States
enter into some manner of multilateral convention on civil jurisdiction to address
the issue of international parallel proceedings, such as the now moribund Hague
Convention. This Article does not pursue such proposals, as it seems highly
unlikely that an international agreement regarding parallel proceedings will be
reached any time soon and, perhaps more importantly, because U.S. courts already have the power to satisfactorily address such cases without help from the
executive and/or legislative branches.
4 See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, "You Can Lead a Horse to Water...": The Supreme Court's Refusal to Allow the Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999 (1989) (analyzing the Supreme Court's narrow
construction of jurisdictional provisions); Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of
Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989) (discussing the abstention doctrine); Martin
H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94
YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (reviewing the abstention doctrine in the federal courts); James
C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1993) (arguing that the abstention doctrine should reflect the
Constitution's forum neutrality); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1984) (arguing that judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction is "much more pervasive than is generally recognized"); David A. Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651 (1985)
(reviewing the ColoradoRiver abstention doctrine); Lewis Yelin, Burford Abstention
in Actions for Damages, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1871 (1999) (arguing against the extension of the Burford abstention doctrine).
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to frame the problem in terms of "abstention," the hoary term
adopted by the Supreme Court to describe the jurisprudence fashioned in a line of cases beginning in the 1940's. 5 What these statefocused articles have failed to consider in-depth, however, is
whether the Supreme Court's domestic abstention doctrinescreated within the context of a constitutional federal system of government- are at all apt for addressing the issues that arise in the
situation of an internationalparallel proceeding.
This Article seeks to begin a debate on the appropriate constitutional framework for U.S. courts faced with the question of
whether to decline the exercise of their jurisdiction in international,
parallel proceedings cases. Specifically, this Article proposes a judicial approach rooted in and based on historic common law principles of adjudicatory comity. 6 Comity, of course, is not without its
critics 7 and, undoubtedly, at the mere mention of the term red flags
will go up for some readers. Nevertheless, in this Article, I argue
that comity, properly understood within its common law historical context, provides the key for the Supreme Court and other federal
courts to deal dynamically with international parallel proceedings,
while simultaneously meeting the requirements of constitutionality.
This should not be seen as a vague, fluffy or controversial
statement. Since the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme
Court has turned to principles of comity to decline or limit the ex-

For a summary of the Court's abstention case law, see infra Section 5.
This Article focuses on the federal treatment of international parallel proceeding cases. Accordingly, domestic parallel proceeding cases are not considered here, except insofar as the rationale of those cases bears upon the treatment
of foreign lisalibi pendens, as it clearly does in a number of federal cases. In addition, as noted below, this Article addresses cases involving assertions of in personam jurisdiction, not in rem proceedings or bankruptcy matters.
7 See, e.g., SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE
5
6

FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS 26

(1828) (describing comity as "a phrase, which is grating to the ear, when it proceeds from a court of justice"); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEo.L.J. 53
(1991) (arguing that reciprocal comity is discriminatory and damaging to the rule
of law). See also A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 10 (1896) (describing the reliance on comity as "a singular
specimen of confusion of thought produced by laxity of language"); Peter Kaye,
Jurisdictionaldiscretion of English courts (3), 134 SOLIC. J.703, 706 (1990) ("References
to comity... should only be made with caution, and preferably dropped altogether."). For a review of early continental European criticism of comity, see, e.g.,
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber's De Confiictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REV. 375 (1918) (discussing Huber's view on the "Conflict of Laws").
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ercise of federal jurisdiction in international cases. And, as I will
demonstrate in this Article, the historic, common law principles of
comity - in particular adjudicatory comity - are the very same principles that underlie current case law on the enforcement of foreign
judgments and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In short, this Article will show that the principles of comity
empower the federal courts, as a matter inherent to their judicial
function, to exercise discretion with respect to their jurisdiction in
cases of international parallel proceedings. Moreover, in exercising
this comity-based discretion, the courts are not bound by the Supreme Court's domestic abstention jurisprudence and its attendant
federalism concerns. Instead, they are empowered to craft rules
based upon the fundamental concerns addressed by principles of
comity and raised in international cases. And, as this Article will
show, historically the courts have been able to craft sensible and
workable rules for translating the theoretical concept of comity into
practice in the context of federal jurisdiction.
Following a brief sketch of the problem of international parallel
proceedings in Section 2, this Article addresses the history, basic
character, and criticisms of comity. Section 3 examines the development of comity in Anglo-American common law, from its origins as a basis for resolving issues related to the conflicts of laws
("prescriptive comity"), to its place as a basis for domestic courts to
defer or limit the exercise of jurisdiction in deference to the courts
of another sovereign ("adjudicatory comity"). A review of this history demonstrates the firm place that principles of comity occupy
in the common law generally. However, it also reveals the way in
which adjudicatory comity in particular has served as the animating principle for the federal courts' treatment of foreign judgments
and development of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Such a historical review of the lineage of adjudicatory comity
should prove useful here because, as we shall see, current invocations of "international comity" by the federal courts in cases of international parallel proceedings seem largely unaware of the character and pedigree of comity within the common law. Few federal
courts seem to understand that the common law adopted comity
over two-hundred years ago specifically to provide a theoretical
justification for allowing courts to defer to the legislative, judicial,
and executive activities of a foreign sovereign in order to do justice
in individual cases. Such a review is also useful for showing that
much of the academic criticism of comity has been misplaced.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss3/1
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Section 4 carries the review of the development of comity in the
common law to the role played by comity in the state courts in foreign parallel proceedings cases. As Section 4 shows, for over one
hundred years the common law in the states has embraced the idea
that principles of comity grant the courts discretion not to exercise
their jurisdiction in cases involving international parallel proceedings. Much more than that, however, the common law is uniform
such that such discretion should be exercised freely and later-filed
domestic proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome of
earlier-filed foreign proceedings involving substantially similar
parties and issues. Indeed, a number of state courts have even developed detailed frameworks of analysis for implementing this
presumption in favor of the extension of comity to foreign proceedings in appropriate cases.
Against the backdrop of the uniform application of principles
of comity to foreign parallel proceedings in the common law state
courts, Section 5 asks whether such discretionary extension of comity to foreign parallel proceedings is constitutionally permissible in
the federal context. In so doing, Section 5 addresses the work of
other commentators who have discussed the nature of federal jurisdiction and argued for varying limits on the exercise of discretion by federal courts in carrying out Congress's jurisdictional
grants. Section 5 concludes that both as a matter of the Supreme
Court's own jurisprudence and sound constitutional theory, historic common law principles of adjudicatory comity provide a legitimate basis for jurisdictional discretion in international parallel
proceedings cases.
Section 5 also considers the current treatment of international
parallel proceedings in the federal courts. As noted above, there is
currently no agreed analytical framework for addressing international parallel proceedings in the federal courts. As a result,
among the federal courts, various bases for the exercise (or nonexercise) of discretion in international parallel proceedings cases
have been advanced. On the whole, these cases have sought to justify their divergent approaches via analogies to the Supreme
Court's domestic parallel proceedings of jurisprudence. Section 5
argues that none of these approaches are satisfactory because the
analogies are inapt. Instead, the federal courts should recognize
that the basis for discretion to decline jurisdiction in appropriate
cases lies in common law principles of adjudicatory comity, which
are not preempted by Congress's jurisdictional grants.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Section 6 discusses how the federal courts should exercise that
discretion. Section 6 rejects domestic analogies as inappropriate
for analyzing the basis of federal court discretion in international
cases. Instead, Section 6 argues that courts should be looking to
principles of adjudicatory comity for guidance in crafting rules and
presumptions in order to specifically respond to the issues raised
in cases of international parallel proceedings. Section 6 goes on to
propose how principles of adjudicatory comity can be fashioned
into a workable and constitutionally acceptable framework for application by the federal courts.
2. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS

It is often stated that increased global commerce, combined
with expansive concepts of personal jurisdiction, has led to a proliferation of the number of cases in which jurisdiction to adjudicate
lies in the courts of more than one country. 8 While "[I]n an ideal
juridical world, the venue in which a piece of transnational litigation proceeded would not affect the resolution of that litigation," 9
in reality, venue may have an enormous impact on the outcome of
a dispute. Whether as a result of differences in the procedural
rules of the fora or variations in the cost and convenience of litigating in a particular venue, or simply because choice of law rules
may differ (or be applied differently) between jurisdictions, the
battle for where litigation is to take place may often be the most
important and bitterly fought issue in a transnational case. 10 Not
only may the forum in which the parties litigate have a decisive effect on how a particular case is decided, but winning or losing the
8 See, e.g., Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992)
(noting that every transnational commercial transaction "presents the possibility
of concurrent jurisdiction in the courts of the nations of the parties involved concerning any dispute arising in the transaction"); Smith Kline v. Bloch, [1983] 1
W.L.R. 730, 737-38 (C.A. 1983) (discussing possible jurisdiction in more than one
country).
9 Andrew S. Bell, The Negative Declarationin TransnationalLitigation, 111 LAW
Q. REV. 674, 674 (1995).
10 See ADRIAN BRIGGS & PETER REES, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 194 (2d
ed. 1997) ("[It is undeniable that the question where a dispute is to be tried will
very often be the most significant factor in the parties' appraisal of the likely outcome of the case."); David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in
TransnationalPersonal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions,
68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 938 (1990) (discussing choice of jurisdiction transnational personal injury actions).
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battle of the fora may also have profound implications for the way
the parties view the strength of their respective cases and, hence,
the attractiveness and likelihood of settlement."
2.1. Types of InternationalParallelProceedings
Given the stakes at issue, it is not surprising that although an
action has been brought initially in the courts of country A, frequently one of the parties to that action, whether the original plaintiff or defendant, will decide, for whatever reason of perceived advantage, to bring a subsequent action in the courts of country B. If
the subsequent action is brought by the plaintiff in the original action, its action may do little more than duplicate the already pending lawsuit. 1 2 There may be some basis of recovery or available relief which is peculiar to the subsequently chosen forum, or the
plaintiff may simply seek to make matters more onerous on the defendant by requiring the defense of litigation in multiple fora.
When the subsequent litigation is brought by the original defendant, however, the circumstances may be quite different. Here,
the form of the subsequent action is likely to vary depending on
the character of the original, pending lawsuit. 13 For example, the
first lawsuit may simply seek a declaration of the plaintiff's nonliability to the defendant (a so-called "negative declaration"). In
such a case, the original defendant may decide to initiate its own
action in a different forum for damages, so as to assume for itself the
role of plaintiff. Conversely, where the original litigation is a
straight, run-of-the-mill damages action and not a claim for declaratory relief, the defendant may still seek to become a plaintiff in
its own right by initiating litigation in a different forum on claims
11One court noted that:
[T]he reality of the matter is that my decision as to the venue for
trial will put one party or the other into a stronger position
when negotiating any possible settlement of this claim. I cannot
think of any other reason why the parties should go to such
trouble and expense over this preliminary skirmish.
The "Al Battani," (1993) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 219, 221 (Q.B.D. Eng.).
12 See generally Allan D. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1960)
(discussing the occurrence of multiple litigation arising from a single situation).
13 See Allan D. Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REV. 11 (1961) (discussing
the situations in which a defendant in one lawsuit will initiate reactive legislation
based on the same factual controversy in another jurisdiction).
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that may or may not be available as counterclaims in the original
action. Alternatively, the original defendant may bring its own belated claim for a negative declaration in a different forum. As Andreas Lowenfeld has famously put it, "Forum shopping, which
used to be a favorite indoor sport of international lawyers, has de14
veloped into a fine art."
2.2. Why InternationalParallelProceedingsAre Problematic
Even allowing for the exercise of party autonomy, there is almost nothing in principle to support the maintenance of concurrent, parallel proceedings in the courts of different countries. Indeed, if one assumes the existence of a substantial identity of the
parties and issues and that justice is able to be done in the courts of
both country A and country B, one can quickly recognize that entertaining concurrent, parallel proceedings of the type described
raises a host of objections.1 5 Such duplicative litigation carries with
it increased costs and inconvenience to the parties 16 and invites
deep-pocketed litigants to attempt to exhaust less financially robust adversaries through the institution of multiple proceedings in
different jurisdictions around the world.' 7 In addition, parallel
14 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of InternationalLitigation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 314, 314 (1997).
See also The Atlantic Star, [1974] A.C. 436, 471 (H.L.) ("'Forum-shopping is... a
pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he
will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his case can be most favourably
presented .... ).
15 My objections to parallel proceedings apply to truly competing, parallel
proceedings and do not encompass merely related proceedings. If two sets of
proceedings involve different parties, different facts, or different legal claims, the
arguments against multiplicity lose their force. See infra Section 5 (addressing foreign lis alibi pendens cases).
16 See, e.g., Efco Corp. v. Aluma Sys., USA, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 816, 824 (S.D.
Iowa 1997) (stating that, for the case at hand, "[m]aintaining two concurrent and
simultaneous proceedings would consume a great amount of judicial, administrative, and party resources for only speculative gain"); The Abidin Daver, [1984] 1
A.C. 398, 410 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) ("[I]t must be more expensive
to litigate about liability for the same collision in two jurisdictions than it would
be to litigate in one alone.").
17 Parallel proceedings also invite tactical gamesmanship by litigants designed to delay the suit from proceeding in the forum not of their choice. For an
example of how parallel proceedings can multiply and beget parallel proceedings
of their own, see Airbus Industrie G.I.E. v. Patel, [1999] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
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proceedings carry the risk of legal havoc caused by inconsistent
decisions in different courts on the same issues between the same
parties. 18
Moreover, even if inconsistent decisions are not reached because of the application of res judicata, one tribunal's expenditure
of time and effort will prove wasted as a result of the duplication
of effort. 19 Thus, the maintenance of parallel proceedings consumes scarce judicial and administrative resources, which could
otherwise be allocated more efficiently by adjudication through a
single litigation in a single forum. 20 As Philip Kurland has observed of the problem generally:
It hardly seems appropriate that, with our judicial resources
taxed to the extent they are, actions should proceed simultaneously in both courts [state and federal actions raising the same
questions] with the judgment in one ultimately to be utilized as
res judicata in the second ....[C]ertainly proceedings in two
courts to resolve the same questions between the same parties
is a patent abuse when the Chief Justice of the United States
and the Chief Justices of most of our industrial States continually testify to the immense problems of judicial administration
which exist because the courts of their respective jurisdictions
21
are so heavily overburdened with litigation.

Numerous courts have identified this potential problem. See, e.g., Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int'l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(noting that'a stay of litigation minimizes the risk of inconsistent judgments with
respect to related claims); The Abidin Daver, [1984] 1 A.C. at 412 ("Comity deIt is a recipe for
mands that such a situation should not be permitted to occur ....
confusion and injustice."). The House of Lords' Privy Council faced just this
situation in Showlag v. Mansour, [1995] 1 A.C. 431 (P.C. 1994) (appeal taken from
Jersey) (U.K.).
19 The Hunt v. B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) litigation is a prime example. There,
Hunt commenced proceedings in Texas for negative declaratory relief approximately one month after commencement of proceedings for damages brought by
B.P. in England. The English court arrived at a decision first and the Texas court,
before which Hunt's declaratory action was still pending, gave res judicata effect
to the Texas declaration. The Texas proceedings to that point were for naught.
Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya), 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980); B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Hunt, [1983] 2 A.C. 352 (H.L. 1981) (appeal taken from Eng.).
See also Note, Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Ternination of Concurrent
State Litigation, 59 YALE L.J. 978, 983 (1950) ("One tribunal's expenditure of time
and effort will prove wasted since the first decision will be res judicata in the
other suit.").
20 See, e.g., Efco Corp., 983 F. Supp. at 824.
21 Philip B. Kurland, Toward A Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Fed18
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Lastly, the pendency of parallel proceedings in the courts of
two or more countries may serve, in some cases, to increase tensions between those countries as a matter of state-to-state rela22
tions.
2.3.

PrincipleMethods of Response to InternationalParallel
Proceedings

In traditional terms, a court presented with a domestic action
which parallels a pending foreign action is said to have a case of
"lis alibi pendens" before it, literally "a lawsuit pending elsewhere." 23 Barring the applicability of a legislative or treaty-based
scheme for allocating jurisdiction with the foreign forum, 24 a court
faced with a case of international lis alibi pendens has three principle
options. 25 First, the domestic court may decide to decline the exercise of its own jurisdiction by staying or dismissing its own proceedings in favor of the pending foreign action. Second, the domestic court may attempt to take exclusive jurisdiction of the
dispute through the issuance of an injunction, an "anti-suit injunction," prohibiting the parties from any further proceedings in the
foreign action.2 6 Third, and usually as the result of the denial of a
eral Court Abstention Doctrine, Address Before the Conference of Chief Justices at
Miami Beach, Fla. (Aug. 20, 1959), in 24 F.R.D. 481, 491-92 (1960).
22 The litigation surrounding the bankruptcy of Laker Airways and Laker's
subsequent efforts to pursue antitrust claims in the United States is, perhaps, the
most famous recent example of the way in which international parallel proceedings can give rise to diplomatic and political tensions. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizing the
tensions created by the court's decision).
23 PETER NORTH & J.J. FAwCErr, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAw 347 (13th ed. 1999).
24 Such schemes are not unheard of. For example, the Brussels Regulation
provides rules for the treatment of parallel proceedings among members of the
European Union. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC). The
Lugano Convention makes the same rules applicable to states within the European Economic Area. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 88/592, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9.
25 See, e.g., Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, [1999] 1 A.C. 119, 131-33 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (discussing the three basic options before the court).
26 As noted in the Introduction, U.S. courts are not uniform in their approaches to the issuance of anti-suit injunctions in international cases. See, e.g.,
George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589 (1990) (discussing problems and controversies associated with use of anti-suit injunctions). The focus of this Article, however, is on
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request for one of the first two options, the domestic court may decide to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the foreign court, thus
allowing both actions to proceed simultaneously.
2.4.

An Outline of the Varied and UnsatisfactoryApproaches Taken
by the Federal Courts Mhen Asked to Stay or Dismiss Their
Own Proceedings

As noted at the outset, the U.S. federal courts currently are divided regarding the proper analytical framework for determining
whether to decline jurisdiction in international lis alibi pendens cases.
There are three principle factions. The first faction, which I have
dubbed the "Abstentionists," begin by drawing an analogy between
international lis alibi pendens cases and cases in which a federal court
is asked to defer to pending state proceedings as a matter of "wise
judicial administration." These courts therefore rely on the Supreme Court's "abstention" case law in reaching their decisions,
27
namely, Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States
and its progeny. In so doing, the Abstentionists emphasize a "virtually unflagging obligation [on the federal courts] ...to exercise
the jurisdiction granted to them by Congress." 28 They accordingly
limit deference to foreign proceedings to cases involving "exceptional circumstances," which clearly does not include the simple
fact of a foreign lis alibi pendens.
The second faction, which I have dubbed the "Landites," begins by analogizing international parallel proceedings to cases involving lis alibi pendens in two federal courts. These courts therefore
rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Landis v. North American
Co. in reaching their decisions. 29 In so doing, these courts emphasize the wastefulness of public and private resources involved in
entertaining parallel proceedings and, therefore, find a broad discretion to defer to pending foreign proceedings. Finally, a third

whether, and under what circumstances, a U.S. federal court should stay or dismiss its own proceedings in favor of those pending in the courts of another country. Accordingly, cases involving the issuance of anti-suit injunctions are not addressed here, except insofar as those cases are considered by the federal courts
when deciding whether to decline jurisdiction. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 909.
27 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
28 Id. at 1248.
29 Landis v. N. Amer. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
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group of courts, which I have dubbed the "Internationalists," eschews both of these approaches. They follow instead what the
Eleventh Circuit has called a doctrine of "international abstention."
This doctrine purportedly arises directly out of "international comity," as well as the court's inherent power to manage cases before
it.
Notably, all three factions, not just the Internationalists, agree
that "international comity" is somehow implicated. Unfortunately,
none of the courts have made much effort to address what they
mean by "international comity," and, in any case, they are widely
divided as to how such "international comity" -whatever it may
be - should apply in individual cases. The courts have not attempted to explain in any depth where this "international comity"
comes from. Neither have they explained how "international comity" relates to the nature of the discretion that the courts purport to
be exercising, nor how it shapes the manner in which these cases
are decided.
As a result, the only practical meaning of "international cornity" in the current case law is its role as a signal to litigants that the
court will engage in some sort of ad hoc balancing in reaching its
decision. This is unfortunate because when one looks at the history of comity, and the course of its development in the common
law, one finds that comity has a firm place as a basis for the exercise of principled judicial discretion in jurisdictional matters.
Moreover, comity embodies specific interests and values to which
the federal courts can look to fashion coherent legal rules for decision-making in foreign lis alibi pendens cases. Although I will return to the federal courts and their current dilemma in due course,
I now turn to the history and character of comity, to provide a basic understanding of the one concept that all of the federal courts,
regardless of their approach, purport to rely upon when faced with
cases of international lis alibi pendens.
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADJUDICATORY COMITY IN THE
COMMON LAW

In this Section, I review the history of comity in the common
law, tracing its use and development in three distinct phases: first,
as a jurisprudential solution for conflicts of laws problems; second,
as the basis for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and, third, as
the theoretical support for the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss3/1
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At the outset, I note that there are two types of "comity" relevant to our inquiry here: "prescriptive comity" and "adjudicatory
comity." As described in detail below, the first -prescriptive comity- is a term used to justify the decision of a sovereign to permit
the application of foreign law within its own territory and, by implication, to limit the application of its own law to matters within
its jurisdiction. Prescriptive comity explains -jurisprudentially how a domestic sovereign can give effect to the laws of another
sovereign within its own territory, while at the same time maintaining its claim to absolute sovereign power. As discussed in Section 3.1, below, comity in this "prescriptive" sense provided the
basis for the common law's development of conflicts of laws jurisprudence.
However, while prescriptive comity addresses the question of
the domestic sovereign's application of foreign law generally, it
does not squarely address the question of the impact, if any, of the
acts of a foreign court within the domestic sovereign's territory.
Therefore, on the heels of the development of comity-based conflicts of laws rules, the common law next addressed the question
whether a domestic sovereign could or should defer within its own
jurisdiction to specific judgments rendered by foreign courts. As
discussed in Section 3.2, below, the common law's answer to this
question built upon the principles of prescriptive comity that undergird the approach taken to conflicts of laws questions. In the
end, the common law articulated a second type of comity"adjudicatory comity" - related specifically to the acts of foreign
courts, and not just to the question of foreign law generally.
Notably, while the common law originally developed the principle of adjudicatory comity to address the recognition and enforcement of previously rendered foreign judgments, it soon came
to extend those principles to yet a third problem: whether, and
under what circumstances, if any, a domestic sovereign should actually defer to a foreign court as the appropriate forum in the first
instance, i.e., before a foreign action had even been filed. As discussed in Section 3.3, below, the common law developed the doctrine of forum non conveniens to address this problem, a doctrine
that is itself rooted in the principles of adjudicatory comity.
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3.1. The OriginalRole: PrescriptiveComity and the Conflicts of
Laws
Comity first developed in its "prescriptive" sense when legal
theorists in the seventeenth century addressed the question of conflicts of law, hypothesizing and justifying instances in which foreign law might be recognized within a domestic legal system. For
these theorists, comity served, in the absence of any public international law rules, as the theoretical bridge to link national and foreign legal systems. However while "prescriptive" comity in this
way filled in gaps in public international law, "prescriptive" comity did not become a doctrine of public international law. Instead,
"prescriptive" comity became a creature of domestic law.
Even
more specifically, prescriptive comity became the province of domestic courts, and not the province of legislative or executive institutions. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, domestic
courts used comity to develop specific rules in the context of conflicts of law decisions. In so doing, these courts articulated three
goals associated with comity that were to animate all future adaptations of comity-based discretion by the common law.
3.1.1.

Comity's development as a bridge between national and
foreign legal systems in the absence of rules provided by
public internationallaw

Comity originally developed in seventeenth-century Europe as
a theoretical explanation for how an absolutely powerful domestic
sovereign could give effect to foreign law within its territory without implicitly diminishing or denying its absolute power. 30 Proceeding from the core principle that the application of sovereign
power extends to all within the confines of the sovereign's territory, but not beyond, 31 Ulrich Huber and other Dutch legal theorists conceived of comity as a discretionary act of accommodation,
by which a domestic sovereign would recognize within its territory
the laws of a foreign sovereign, as long as that recognition did "not
30 See generally, D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's De Conflictu
Legum on English Private InternationalLaw, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1937); Lorenzen, supra note 7, at 379; Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 9
(1966).
31 Lorenzen, supra note 7, at 403 ("The laws of each state have force within the
limits of that government and bind all subject to it, but not beyond."). For an alternate translation, see Davies, supra note 30.
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cause prejudice to the power or rights of such government or of
their subjects." 32 Notably, the domestic sovereign did not recognize foreign law within its territory because of any binding international obligation.33 Indeed, to have framed the concept would have
been to restrict the sovereign's rights in a way precisely in conflict
34
with the premise of exclusive sovereign territorial power. Rather,
Huber and the other Dutch theorists gave "comity" as the reason
for giving recognition and effect to foreign law.
But why should a domestic sovereign grant this comity to the
laws of a foreign sovereign? For Huber, there were two principle
reasons. First, Huber saw that the application of foreign law in individual cases would promote the ends of justice. Second, Huber
explained that "[a]lthough the laws of one country can have no direct force in another country, yet nothing could be more inconvenient to the commerce and general intercourse of nations than that
transactions valid by the law of one place should be rendered of no
35 The reasons
effect elsewhere owing to a difference in the law."
for comity thus embraced the aspirational goal of doing justice in
individual cases, as well as the practical goal of creating an international environment in which transnational commerce could flourish.
Lorenzen, supra note 7, at 401.
33 See, e.g., Comity of Nations, 31 L. MAG. 276 (1844); Ernest G. Lorenzen,
Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws- One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 15 (1934); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,
(1991). For a view that Huber's conception of comity implied binding obligations
of international law, see Davies, supra note 30, at 57-58; Yntema, supra note 30, at
29-30. See also Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law-The General Part, in
32

INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS

1, 38 (Eliho Lauterpacht ed., 1970) (sug-

gesting that while "public international law in no way limits the freedom of action
of States" in the application of choice of law rules, nevertheless, even in the absence of treaty, "they are not, in principle, free to disregard foreign law altogether"). I find the suggestions that comity imposes international law obligations
to be unconvincing. Even assuming that there are situations in which a domestic
state's application of its own law or refusal to recognize foreign law may create an
international delict that gives rise to complaint by the foreign sovereign, surely
that result occurs as a consequence of the effect such refusal has upon the foreign
sovereign's nation and not per se because of the nature of the domestic sovereign's choice of law rules or lack of them.
"whatever force
34 As Story commented with regard to Huber's position:
solely upon the
depend
another,
in
have
country
one
of
laws
the
and obligation
" STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
laws, and municipal regulations of the latter ....
CONFLICT OF LAWS
35

§ 23 (2d ed. 1841).

See Lorenzen, supranote 7, at 401.
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Huber's comity was a "prescriptive" comity. Clearly, the sovereign already held the power to prescribe the rules for dealing
with cases in its courts, and could apply its own law if it so chose.
Comity, however, provided the domestic sovereign with a highlevel theoretical prescription for how it could forego such an exercise of power within its territory, without simultaneously diminishing its sovereignty. Moreover, Huber's prescriptive comity also
provided an explanation for a corollary limitation on the reach of
the sovereign's own laws; by allowing foreign law to have effect
within its territory, the sovereign also implicitly limited the scope
of application of its own laws. Thus, from its inception, comity occupied a unique position within the law because it served as a
bridge between national and foreign legal systems where public
international law provided no rules.
But how should the sovereign decide when it is actually appropriate to defer to foreign law in individual cases? To answer
this question, Huber used his general maxims to construct specific
rules for the extension of comity to foreign law in various classes of
cases. It is not necessary here to explore in detail Huber's thoughts
on when a domestic sovereign should extend comity to foreign
laws in cases such as a marriage consecrated in another country 36
or moveable property37 and wills. 38 Instead, the important point to
note is that although comity provided a general theoretical justification for the decision of a domestic sovereign to give recognition
and effect to foreign law within its territory, comity did not-in
and of itself -provide the rules for when that recognition and effect should be granted in specific cases. That latter decision was
left to the domestic sovereign to determine as a matter of its domestic law through the construction of rules addressed to the factual circumstances of the type of case before it -always bearing in
mind the original and overarching goals of comity: to do justice in
individual cases and to foster the effective flow of international
commerce.

36 Lorenzen, supra note 7, at 410.
37 Id. at 417.
38 Id. at 405.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss3/1

2006]

INTERNATIONAL PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS

3.1.2.

Principles of prescriptive comity in practice: the
development of domestic conflicts of laws jurisprudenceby
common law courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries

Although a creature of continental Europe originally, the idea
of comity found its greatest acceptance in the common law, particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Through
the widespread acceptance (in both England and the United States)
39
of Joseph Story's COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, as
40 Huber's prewell as a series of influential judgments in England,
scriptive comity entered the common law as a theoretical explana41 Notably,
tion for the resolution of conflicts of law questions.
within the common law, comity retained the discretionary character originally given to it by Huber. That is, although the question
of extending comity touched upon issues concerning the interaction of sovereign nations-matters typically within the scope of
public international law and international obligation-no state
could demand the application of comity from another as of right.
Thus, although comity in the common law gave rise to purely domestic rules, it nevertheless retained its role as a bridge between
public and private international law and as a force for mediating
between foreign and domestic law.

supra note 34.
See, e.g., Robinson v. Bland, (1760) 96 Eng.Rep. 129, (K.B.) (holding that a
contract must be judged by the laws of the kingdom. "[F]oreign laws are to be
regarded in England, only where they vary from the general common law: and
not where they contradict express prohibitory statutes."). Holman et al. v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.) (holding that where goods sold were to be delivered in England where they were prohibited, the contract is void, but if they are
to be delivered elsewhere, this is not the case).
41 See P. E. Nygh, The TerritorialOrigin of English PrivateInternational Law, 2 U.
TASMANIA L. REV. 28, 40 (1964-67) ("It is notable that Huber was the first foreign
author to attract to any great extent the attention of English judges in the latter
part of the eighteenth century. However, by that time the basic territorialism of
the English choice of law rules had already been established and Huber's writings
served only to provide a rational basis for what had been evolved instinctively.");
Davies, supra note 30, at 49.
39 STORY,
40
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3.1.2.1. Common law comity: an internationalconcept used to
fashion domestic rules of law
Being distinct from the regime of public international law, once
comity entered the common law, the decision whether to extend it
in individual cases became a part of the law of the domestic forum.
Story in particular emphasized that the decision whether to apply
comity to the laws and legal acts of foreign sovereigns was reserved exclusively to the province of the domestic sovereign's
laws, e.g., the domestic law of the United States. 42 As Story put it:
"[e]very nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions, on which its exercise may be justly demanded." 43 The point was similarly made in
England in judgments by Lords Mansfield 44 and StowellJ4: as a
matter of common law, the recognition of the laws and legal acts of
foreign sovereigns was granted not as a result of any superseding
obligation binding upon the Crown, but as a matter of the law of
England. Consistent with Huber's original conception, this "local
law interpretation" 46 of prescriptive comity carried with it the crucial proviso that comity need never be extended to foreign laws
and acts where to do so would be prejudicial to the fundamental
policies of the domestic forum.47

42 STORY,

supra note 34, § 34.

43 Id. § 33.
44 See, e.g., Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.) (holding that

slave brought in from where slavery was allowed must be freed because slavery
was illegal in England).
45 Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (P.) ("Being entertained in an English Court, it must be adjudicated according to English law ...
applicable to such a case."). See Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen, (1851) 68 Eng. Rep.
571, 575 (Ch.) (summarizing Story's view: a judge applies foreign law, not because it is enacted by a foreign legislator, but because his own law required the
particular question to be adjudicated according to the foreign law).
46 Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction at a Crossroads:An Intersection
between Publicand Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L. L. 280, 283 (1982).
47 See, e.g., Holman, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1122 (quoting Huber, "[i]n England, tea,
which has not paid duty, is prohibited; where it is not prohibited... and an action
is brought for the price of it in England, the buyer shall be condemned to pay the
price; because the contract was good and valid"); STORY, supra note 34, § 36.
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3.1.2.2. Common law comity: the exclusive province of the
judiciary
Having accepted prescriptive comity as a jurisprudential explanation for the domestic sovereign's discretionary recognition of
foreign laws, common law jurists next faced the question of which
department of the domestic government should exercise the discretion afforded to the sovereign by comity. In both England and the
United States the answer, emphatically, was the judiciary. As
Story concluded from his review of the case law in his
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:

In England and America the courts of justice have hitherto
exercised the same authority in the most ample manner;
and the legislatures have in no instance (it is believed) in either country interfered to provide any positive regulations.
The common law of both countries has been expanded to
meet the exigencies of the times, as they have arisen .... 48
The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this conclusion in 1895 in
Hilton v. Guyot 49 and added its own gloss to the question of which
department of the U.S. government had the power to determine
when comity should be granted:
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such
questions is a treaty or a statute of this country. But
when.., there is no written law upon the subject, the duty
still rests upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to
do so, in order to determine the rights of parties to suits
50
regularly brought before them.
Thus, from its earliest acceptance into the common law of England and the United States, the decision on whether to extend comity in individual cases was seen as a discretion appropriately
vested in the courts, to be exercised by them as a matter of their inherent judicial power. Moreover, that discretion was independent
of the then-prevailing distinctions between law and equity. Its existence and exercise was not dependent upon the nature of the

48 STORY,

supra note 34, § 24.

49 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (discussing Story's COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS).
50 Id. at 163.
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court in which the domestic matter was brought, nor the nature of
the relief sought; in both law and equity, it applied.
3.1.2.3. Common law comity: crafting domestic rules that
achieve three overridinggoals
So how then should the domestic sovereign's courts determine
when to extend comity and apply foreign law in individual cases?
As it had been for Huber, so it was for Story: comity could explain
why the domestic sovereign was able to give effect to a foreign
sovereign's acts within its own territories, but comity did not provide specific rules to say when foreign law should be applied in
individual cases. As Story put it in his COMMENTARIES: "[t]he doctrine of Huberus would seem, therefore, to stand upon just principles... [but] from its generality, it leaves behind many grave questions as to its application .*..."51 It was in answering those
questions that the well-known and well-established rules of con2
flicts of law developed.5
Reviewing the writings of Huber and Story, as well as the early
conflicts of laws decisions, reveals three overriding goals that must
be accomplished by any comity-based, domestic rule: (i) the overarching requirement that justice be done in individual cases; (ii) the
domestic forum's need to vindicate its own fundamental values;
and (iii) the practical desirability of making decisions which would
"further the development of an effectively functioning international system." 53 Notably, the first reason is the primary reason.
Comity is employed primarily to do justice in individual cases by
facilitating the application of the law most appropriate to the parties' dispute, even if it happens to be foreign.
Yet critics frequently overlook this aspect of comity, asserting
erroneously that comity is "designed merely to promote friendly
legal relations between sovereigns and not to protect litigants'

51 STORY, supra note 34, § 38.
52 The basis for the decision

of domestic courts to apply foreign law continues
to be a contention issue for academic commentators. For one of the best reviews
of the issues raised see Friedrich K. Juenger, General Course on Private International
Law, 193 REC. DES CoURS 131, 167 (1983), in which Juenger concludes by noting
that the question of why domestic courts apply foreign law is still very much open
to satisfactory answer, with comity, public international law, vested rights, and
interest analysis all vying for preeminent position.
53 Maier, supra note 46, at 283.
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rights and interests."5 4 Such characterizations confuse the goals of
comity with the role it plays as a jurisprudential theory designed to
preserve territorial sovereignty. Yes, indeed, the early common
law recognized that the extension of comity would promote the
development of international commerce through the recognition of
rights and obligations derived from foreign law, but the courts applied comity with the primary aim of providing justice in individual cases.
In Bank of Augusta v. Earle,for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1839 specifically justified the application of comity on the
grounds that "it contributes so largely to promote justice between
individuals." 55 Likewise, Story summed up the goals of extending
comity by observing that:
The true foundation on which the administration of international law must rest, is, that the rules, which are to govern, are those, which arise from mutual interest and utility,
from a sense of the inconveniences which would result
from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity
to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return. 5 6

Thus, even more important than the conflicts of law rules
themselves are the basic contours of comity as it developed in the
eighteenth and nineteen centuries -namely, its nature as a domestic rule, the fact that it is a form of discretion to be exercised exclusively by the judiciary, and the three basic goals that must be accomplished by any particular domestic rule crafted by common
law courts. As demonstrated in the next section, all of these features were picked up on by the common law, and indeed expanded upon, when common law courts began to consider the
question of whether domestic courts could or should enforce judgments already rendered by foreign courts.

54 James Paul George & Fred C. Pederson, Conflict of Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 383, 409

(1987).
55 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 520 (1839).
56 STORY, supra note 34, § 35. Story's use of the term "international law"
should not be mistaken as a reference to public international law. The term "international law" was often used by early writers to refer to matters of private international law. See Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 145, 212-14 (1972) (discussing meaning and development of the terms "international law" and "private international law").
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3.2. Principlesof Adjudicatory Comity as the Basisfor Limiting the
Exercise of Domestic Court Jurisdiction: The Enforcement of
ForeignJudgments
In the nineteenth century, the common law extended comitybased discretion to a new arena: adjudicatory comity. Specifically,
the domestic sovereign now recognized not only foreign legislative
acts, but foreign judicial acts as well. As discussed in Section 3.2.1,
below, the U.S. Supreme Court solidified the transition in the
United States in the landmark case of Hilton v. Guyot.5 7 Moreover,
as discussed in Section 3.2.2, below, Hilton v. Guyot also added a
new gloss to the ideal of comity that would thereafter be carried
forward in the American common law.
3.2.1. The Common Law Landmark: Hilton v. Guyot
The first obvious application of adjudicatory comity in the
courts of the United States came within the field of the enforcement
of foreign judgments. In essence, the threshold question to be addressed was why a U.S. court would recognize the judicial act of
another sovereign in its courts (i.e., a foreign judgment), or, put
somewhat differently, why a U.S. court would tell a litigant properly before its courts: "No. Even though we have jurisdiction over
the subject matter and parties at issue in this case, you may not litigate the merits of this matter here because it has been adjudicated
already in another country." The Supreme Court answered these
questions in Hilton v. Guyot.
In Hilton, the plaintiff sought enforcement in the United States
of the judgment of a French court. There, the Supreme Court
looked to the concept of comity to justify the exercise of judicial
discretion to decline jurisdiction over the merits of the case, for the
purpose of deferring to the prior-adjudication of a truly, foreign
court. In invoking principles of comity to support its decision, the
Supreme Court sought to define the contours of the term. In the
oft-quoted words of Justice Gray:
The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force
within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate
within the dominion of another nation, depends upon what

57

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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our greatest jurists have been content to call "the comity of
nations." Although the phrase has often been criticised, no
satisfactory substitute has been suggested. "Comity," in
the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws.58
Using this definition of comity, the Supreme Court then went
on to develop a general common law rule governing when U.S.
federal courts should enforce foreign judgments:
Where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting
the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system
of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and
those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which
it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any
other special reason why the comity of this nation should
not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in
an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be
tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere
assertion of a party that the judgment was erroneous in law
59
or in fact.
3.2.1.1.

The misplaced criticism of Hilton's reliance on comity

Justice Gray's definition of comity has been the subject of a host
of academic criticism in both England and the United States. 60
Much of the academic criticism of Justice Gray's attempted definition, and of definitions of comity in general, has been directed at
the difficulty of defining comity with sufficient specificity so as to
Id. at 163-64.
59 Id. at 202-03.
60 See, e.g., Paul, supra note 33, at 9-11 (discussing criticism of Justice Gray's
definition of comity in the United States).
58
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indicate how its principles might apply in specific cases. 61 As an
early continental critic bluntly put it, "one cannot even approximate to a correct decision the simplest case of private international
law upon this principle." 62 Others have described comity as "a
phrase, which is grating to the ear, when it proceeds from a court
of justice" 63 or noted that it as been "employed in a meaningless or
misleading." 64 Nevertheless, even in the face of such criticism, the
definition of comity offered in Hilton is far and away the most cited
65
language on comity in all of American law.
Leaving aside a margin for rhetorical flourish in the phrasing of
some of these critiques, these criticisms of comity demand too
much. Like other terms in the law, "comity," be it prescriptive or
adjudicatory, stands as a short-hand term to denote a collection of
identifiable interests and values that must be balanced in given
cases and from which rules of law develop. 66 That the principles
encompassed by the term "comity" do not present themselves on
67
their face as three-prong tests with shifting burdens of proof,
61 For a somewhat premature obituary of comity, see Rodolfo De Nova, The
First American Book on Conflict of Laws, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 136, 143 (1964) ("[Tjhe
term has by now all but gone out of use in conflicts parlance and this is not to be
regretted. Legal historians may have it all for themselves .... ").
62 W. SCHAFFNER, ENTWICKELUNG DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS § 30
(1841), quoted in FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 76 (William Gutherie, trans., 2d ed. 1880).
63 LIVERMORE, supra note 7, at 16.
64 NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 23, at 5.
65 Hilton's influence extends beyond the United States. Justice Gray's definition of comity has been adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court. See Amchem
Prods. Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Bd., [1993] 102 D.L.R. (4th) 96, 105 (Can.) (quoting
Justice Gray's definition of comity, as quoted in Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye,
[1990] 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256, 269 (Can.)).
66 See Laker Airways. Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances
surrounding each claim for its recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it
imposes are inherently uncertain."); see also STORY, supra note 34, § 36 ("[T]he
phrase, 'comity of nations,'.., is the most appropriate phrase to express the true
foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another."); cf. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569, 595-96 (La. 1827)
("[C]omity is, and ever must be, uncertain... it must necessarily depend on a variety of circumstances, which cannot be reduced within any certain rule.").
67 See Davies, supra note 30, at 58 ("The doctrine of comity, at most, only provides a theoretical foundation upon which a system of Conflict of Laws may be
built."); Maier, supra note 46, at 281 ("[E]mphasis on the voluntary nature of the
doctrine has led to its use to describe an amorphous never-never land whose borders are marked by fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy, and good faith."); Steven R.
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however, hardly seems a reasonable criticism of the doctrine when
the same "deficiency" may be claimed for principles such as "public policy," "equity," 68 and "due process," which are basic to An69
glo-American law.
It is the function of the courts to take such broad principles and
fashion rules of law from them that may be applied in future cases.
Comity is no different. "Rules of comity are a portion of the law
that they enforce. Precedents mark the line that they should follow." 70 If the criticism of comity is really that invocations of comity
can serve as a justification for ad hoc judicial interest balancing,
then it seems that the problem is not so much comity, as it is the
tendency of courts to 71substitute such exercises of discretion for
meaningful legal rules.
Perhaps more important, while much contemporary attention
and criticism of comity has focused on Justice Gray's definition of
comity, Hilton is actually a rather bad example for comity's critics.
In Hilton, the Court did in fact develop very specific and manageable rules for the recognition of foreign judgments in the United
States, rooted explicitly in its understanding of the interests addressed by the principles of comity. In so doing, the Court fashioned a legal framework for the recognition of foreign judgments
that differs very little from the rules generally applicable in the
United States today, more than 100 years after the original deciSwanson, The Vexatiousness of a Vexation Rule: International Comity and Antisuit Injunctions, 30 GEO. WASH. J.INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1996) ("Comity is not a rule;
rather it is a principle or policy that supports court-applied rules.").
68 For an interesting discussion of the similarity between the definitions of
equity and the definitions of comity, see Herbert Barry, Comity, 12 VA. L. REV. 353,
354 (1926).
69 Indeed, although continental writers have been among the harshest critics
of comity, see Lorenzen, supra note 7, at 396-98, such broad, basic principles are
fundamental to civil law systems as well. See Paul, supra note 33, at 32-34 (discussing comity and the similar concept of ordre public in civil law systems).
70 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 139 N.E. 259, 260
(N.Y. 1923).
71 Comity's unpredictable side emerges when courts fail to use its principles
to construct rules of meaningful specificity. Comity has been used to justify
schemes of ad hoc interest balancing that leave parties and lowers courts with
bewilderingly little guidance. See, e.g., Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale
v. U.S. Dist. Court, S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 548 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(criticizing "the Court's case-by-case inquiry for determining whether to use Convention procedures and its failure to provide lower courts with any meaningful
guidance for carrying out that inquiry").
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sion.72 In short, the use of comity to justify a domestic court's decline of jurisdiction has worked well in practice.
Moreover, it should come as no surprise that the common law
used Huber's comity to justify the recognition of both foreign legislative acts and foreign judicial acts. First, Huber's comity addressed the relationship between domestic and international law
and between domestic and foreign legal systems at a high level of
generality. In so doing, Huber's comity raised practical questions
about the manner in which justice should be rendered in the domestic sovereign's courts-the place where these relationships and
systems would most often to clash. As such, the concept of comity,
developed by Huber and advanced by Story into the common law,
carried with it another aspect of application that was not strictly
concerned with prescribing the reach of the domestic sovereign's
laws, but instead with prescribing the jurisdiction of the domestic
sovereign's courts: adjudicatory comity.
Second, although frequently overlooked by scholars of comity,
in his De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis, Huber
specifically anticipated the development of an adjudicatory form of
comity by expanding his study to include the issue of foreign judgment enforcement and the application of res judicata. As to both
subjects, Huber posited that the general principles that he had set
forth, including the sovereign's exercise of comity, could also provide an explanation for why the courts of one country would generally defer to the prior adjudication of a matter in the courts of
another, except, of course, where such recognition conflicted with
73
the domestic forum's own public policy.

72

See

GARY B. BORN,

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES

COURTS 941-42 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that some twenty-two states have adopted

some form of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJRA)
for the enforcement of foreign judgments, and that the UFMJRA is based closely
on Hilton). Compare Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895) (giving deference
to foreign judgments "where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction") with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92, 98 (1971) (stating that valid judgments rendered in foreign nations after a fair trial by a competent court will be recognized in the United
States).
73 Lorenzen, supra note 7, at 376, 378.
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Hilton's additionalgloss on the American understandingof
comity: the comity of the courts

In addition to establishing common law rules for the enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States, the Hilton court
also developed a new principle in the common law conception of
comity. Specifically, the Court limited the inquiry that a domestic
court could undertake into the procedures of the foreign court. Indeed, the Hilton Court expressly rejected the suggestion that it
should undertake a comparison of the systems of civil procedure in
the United States and France and find the French judgment unenforceable because the procedures of the civil law lacked "safe74 Instead,
guards which are by [U.S.] law considered essential."
the Court held that "we are not prepared to hold that the fact that
the procedure... differed from that of our own courts is,75of itself, a
sufficient ground for impeaching the foreign judgment."
This aspect of the Hilton decision draws a distinction between
"adjudicatory comity" and a separate concept known as the "comity of the courts." "Adjudicatory comity" is a set of principles that
justify deference by a domestic court to the judgments of a foreign
court. In contrast, the "comity of the courts" is a tool of analysis
used by the domestic forum's courts in determining whether to extend adjudicatory comity in the case at bar. Thus, when Justice
Gray wrote that "'comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and
good will, upon the other," 76 the comity that he was discussing was
adjudicatory comity (i.e., the principle justifying a domestic court's
unilateral decision to decline or limit its jurisdiction in favor of a
foreign court, where to do so would be in the interests of justice
and would not contravene the domestic forum's public policy).
However, when Justice Gray admonished against comparing
French procedures with U.S. procedures in the Court's inquiry into
whether the French procedures adequately assured a just result in
the case before it, he was referring to comity in a different sense; he
was referring to the "comity of the courts." This "comity of the
74 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 205. In particular, the defendants had complained that
one of the plaintiffs in France had been permitted to testify while not under oath
and had not been subject to cross-examination, and that certain documents had
been admitted into evidence which would have been excluded under U.S. law. Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 163-64.
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courts" is manifestly different from the adjudicatory comity which
animates the domestic court's deference, although it does play an
important role in determining how the domestic sovereign's courts
will exercise adjudicatory comity when called upon to do so.77
As the classical conception of comity by Huber and Story
makes clear, the domestic sovereign's exercise of comity always
depends upon the sovereign's satisfaction that deference to the foreign sovereign will not work an injustice or be against the domestic
forum's fundamental public policy. Unlike Justice Gray in Hilton,
however, neither Huber nor Story posited any restraints upon the
domestic sovereign's inquiry in this regard. There was no sense in
either man's writings that the domestic sovereign should be circumspect in its inquiry into the nature of the foreign law or
whether that foreign law would be unjust or offend the values of
the domestic forum.
However, as the common law transitioned from prescriptive
comity to adjudicatory comity, it incorporated the "comity of the
courts" in its application of adjudicatory comity. Thus, in Hilton,
Justice Gray would not lightly countenance the allegations that
French procedure had been inadequate to assure a just result and,
77 The comity of the courts has become entrenched as a principle of judicial
restraint in many contexts in U.S. and English law. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank
v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27 (1983) (holding
that separate juridical status of foreign state-owned entities will be presumed on
comity grounds in cases involving alleged liability of such entities for acts of their
governments); China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35
(2d Cir. 1987) ("The equitable factors relied upon by the district court in granting
the anti-suit injunction are not sufficient to overcome the restraint and caution required by international comity."); Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796
P.2d 276, 286 (Okla. 1990) (refusing to compare Brazilian and U.S. procedures); see
also Refco Inc. v. E. Trading Co., [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 159, 159 (A.C..) (deciding on
comity grounds that Mareva injunctions should not be issued where a similar order has been applied for and refused by the foreign court); In re State of Norway's
Application (No. 2), [1988] 3 W.L.R. 603, 628 (A.C..), affd in part, [1990] 1 A.C. 723
(H.L.) (using comity to form the basis for the English rule treating a foreign
court's Letters of Request as proper and answerable unless the opposing party can
point to a clear conclusion that the request cannot be properly given effect);
Mackender v. Feldia A.G., [1966] 2 Q.B. 590, 599 (A.C..) (using comity to treat applications for leave to serve process out of England); Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] 1 A.C. 871, 881 (P.C.) (appeal taken from C.A.)
(relying on principles of comity to consider whether an injunction should be
granted to restrain a plaintiff beginning or pursuing an action in another jurisdiction). See generally DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (Lawrence
Collins et al., eds., 13th ed. 2000) (noting comity's role "as a tool for applying or
re-shaping the rules of the conflict of laws").
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indeed, applied a presumption that the French judicial system was
capable of adequately administering justice. Likewise, in cases of
forum non conveniens, to which we will turn next, U.S. courts have
repeatedly emphasized that when considering the adequacy of a
foreign forum, no foreign forum will be declared inadequate
merely because its justice system differs from that of the United
States. 78 It is important to keep the concepts of adjudicatory comity
and the comity of the courts distinct. On the one hand, adjudicatory comity signifies the foundation for the domestic court's exercise of discretion to determine whether it should decline or limit its
exercise of jurisdiction in favor of a foreign court. On the other
hand, the comity of the courts is simply a rule of the domestic forum that guides how that discretion should be exercised.
3.3. Adjudicatory Comity as the Basisfor the Common Law Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens
3.3.1.

The original development of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in Scotland: recognizable roots in adjudicatory
comity

Having relied upon adjudicatory comity to justify the enforcement of foreign judgments, the common law next extended the
principles underlying that view to the related idea that, in certain
78 See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. Even though the Hilton
court determined that there were no grounds for impugning the integrity of the
French judgment under the rules for enforcement it had set forth, the Court nevertheless decided that enforcement should be withheld on the grounds that comity
necessitated reciprocity in the treatment of U.S. judgments by French courts,
which it found was lacking in the case at hand. In this respect, Hilton injected a
very political sense of comity, whereby the courts would be called upon to exercise political and diplomatic judgment in deciding whether adjudicatory comity
was warranted. This was not faithful to the comity of Huber and Story that had
entered the common law. Moreover, as Chief Justice Fuller pointed out in dissent,
even if it might be appropriate for the domestic sovereign generally to consider
reciprocity in its relations with other sovereigns, the judiciary was the wrong government institution to make such a political decision. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 234
("[1It is for the government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion .... ) (Fuller C.J., dissenting). In any event, this misconception of adjudicatory comity as a political tool was short-lived, and today there is no suggestion
that comity in the recognition of foreign judgments depends upon reciprocity. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92, 98 (1971) (requiring no reciprocity in order to recognize foreign nation judgments as valid). See generally BORN,
supra note 72, at 938-42 (noting contemporary approaches to enforceability of foreign judgments in the United States).
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cases, a domestic court ought to go a step further and decline to
exercise jurisdiction where the foreign action was not yet pending.
As has been well-traced in academic writings 79 and judicial opinions,80 the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as it came to be known,
originated in the courts of Scotland in the 1800s. 81 Reviewing those
early Scottish cases, it is clear that, in deferring the exercise of their
jurisdiction to the courts of a foreign sovereign, the Scottish courts
were not exercising a discretion based upon any particular statutory authority, but rather upon principles of adjudicatory comity.8 2
79

See, e.g., Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35

CAL. L. REV. 380, 386-87 (1947) (noting that the term, forum non conveniens, ap-

peared to have been first used in the Scottish courts, where use of the doctrine
was a well-established rule); Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in
Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1929) (citing several Scottish cases and
treatises as leading exposition on the doctrine of forum non conveniens); Robert
Braucher, The Inconvenient FederalForum, 60 HARV. L. REV. 908, 909-10 (1947) (stating that the term, forum non conveniens, was first used in Scotland in the latter part
of the nineteenth century, and that the scope of the doctrine itself was the subject
of much disagreement among the Scottish courts); Joseph Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867, 870 (1935) (noting that the "doctrine and plea of forum non conveniens" has a long tradition of practice in Scotland).
80 See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994) ("Although
the origins of the doctrine in Anglo-American law are murky, most authorities
agree that forum non conveniens has its earliest expression.., in Scottish estate
cases.").
81 See generally DAVID MAXWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF SESSION 11516 (1980) (reviewing the Scottish doctrine of forum non conveniens). In some early
cases in the United States, the courts did claim discretion to decline jurisdiction in
cases more appropriately heard elsewhere -usually in admiralty cases involving
foreign seamen- but those cases are sporadic and their reasoning sparse, and they
cannot be fairly read to have marked a general acceptance of forum non conveniens
by U.S. common law at such an early stage. See, e.g., Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 F.
Cas. 1283, 1284 (D. Pa. 1801) (declining jurisdiction of an admiralty case involving
foreign seamen except in special cases, such as to protect seamen against "oppression and injustice"); Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817)
(declining on "principles of policy" jurisdiction of a tort case where the tort was
committed on the high seas aboard a foreign vessel and where both parties were
foreigners); cf. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of CourtAccess Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 796 n.43 (1984) (arguing, erroneously in my
view, that courts in these cases "absolutely precluded" the exercise of discretion
with respect to matters of jurisdiction).
82 See Sim v. Robinow, [1892] 9 S.C. 665, 669 (H.L.) (reviewing Scottish cases
and finding that "[i]n all these cases there was one indispensable element present
when the Court gave effect to the plea of forum non conveniens, namely, that the
Court was satisfied that there was another Court in which the action ought to be
tried as being more convenient for all the parties, and more suitable for the ends
of justice"); Williamson v. The N-E. Ry. Co., [1884] 11 S.C. 596, 598 (Sess.) (stating
that although jurisdiction of the case was "undeniable," the "question of forum
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Thus, even though a plaintiff may have complied with the rules of
venue and jurisdiction, the Scottish courts nevertheless held the
power to decline jurisdiction in cases where the Court found that
the interests of justice required the matter to be heard in the courts
of another nation.
As Lord Sumner put it in La Socidt6 du Gaz de Paris v. Socit
Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Franais": "[t]he object in the
words non conveniens... is to find that forum which is the more
suitable for the ends of justice and which is preferable because pursuit of litigation in that forum is more likely to secure the ends of
justice."8 3 Addressing the conflict between the court's duty to entertain an action over which it has jurisdiction- reflected in the
4
phrase, "judex tenetur impertirijudicium"8 - and its discretion to exercise adjudicatory comity towards a foreign forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Lord Sumner observed that "the
Court's duty to entertain the suit can be no higher than its duty to
listen, then, if the circumstances warrant it, to sustain the plea [of
85
forum non conveniens]."
In essence, through the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the
Scottish courts were endorsing the view that there might be occasions in which a domestic court could properly tell litigants before
it, "No, you may not litigate this matter here, because even though
jurisdiction and venue properly lie in this court, in the interests of
justice, this matter is more appropriately heard in the courts of another nation to which we will defer." This, of course, is the essence
of adjudicatory comity.
3.3.2.

Early U.S. practice: the common law development of
jurisdictionaldiscretion in cases in admiralty

The doctrine of forum non conveniens entered U.S. common law
following the Scottish model. In the United States, the doctrine
conveniens" must be additionally considered); Clements v. Macaulay, [1866] 4 S.C.
583, 592 n.* (Sess.) (noting that the plea of forum non conveniens raises the question
of whether, "for the interests of the parties, and for the interests of justice, the
cause may more suitably be tried elsewhere"); Longworth v. Hope, [1865] 3 S.C.
1049, 1053 n.* (Sess.) (noting that the plea of forum non competens is appropriate in
"cases in which the Court may consider it more proper for the ends of justice that
the parties should seek their remedy in another forum").
83 [1925] 23 Lloyd's List. Rep. 209, 213 (Sess.).
84 Id. at 212.
85 Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
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was accepted first largely in the courts of admiralty and some state
courts, but not in the federal courts.86 The reason for this peculiar
path of development lay in the unique nature of the admiralty
courts and the limitations on the assertion of jurisdiction in nonadmiralty courts prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 1945 in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.87
The discretion in the courts of admiralty to extend adjudicatory
comity to the courts of another sovereign (whether or not given the
formal label "forum non conveniens") was a natural fit almost from
the founding of those courts in the United States. 88 The admiralty
courts possessed a broad jurisdiction that was not confined by the
territorial requirements placed upon the courts at law and equity.
Additionally, the admiralty courts were unencumbered by any
limiting venue provisions. 89
Adjudicatory comity, therefore,
through the development of the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
served as a ready tool for domestic admiralty courts to limit the potential reach of their jurisdiction and ensure that justice would be
done in individual cases. 90 Notably, the reasoning of the admiralty
86 American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1994) (citing Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504-05, 505 n.4 (1947)). See also Alexander M.
Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty: An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion, 35 CORNELL L. Q. 12,
16-19, 26 (1949) (discussing Gilbert).
87 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Stein, supra note 81, at 80304 (noting that the "minimum contacts test" in InternationalShoe expanded plaintiffs' choices of forum selection because personal jurisdiction was no longer dependent upon the "physical presence of the defendant within the jurisdiction").
88 See, e.g., Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 F. Cas. 1283, 1284 (D. Pa. 1801) (declining jurisdiction of an admiralty case involving foreign seamen under a "reciprocal
policy" of comity, rooted in "justice due from one friendly nation to another");
Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) ("[Olur Courts may
take cognizance of torts committed on the high seas, on board of a foreign vessel
where both parties are foreigners; but I am inclined to think it must, on principles
of policy, often rest in the sound discretion of the Court to afford jurisdiction or
not, according to the circumstances of the case.").
89 See Braucher, supra note 79, at 919 (discussing the federal courts' development of discretionary power to decline jurisdiction); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65
YALE L.J. 289, 303-04 (1956) (noting that admiralty courts are unencumbered by
venue provisions that would limit the subjection of non-citizens to domestic jurisdiction).
90 Cf. Stein, supra note 81, at 810 ("The formal jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts was intentionally overinclusive to assure that seamen frequently working
abroad were provided with an adequate remedy. The forum non conveniens doctrine was the only tool available to limit the jurisdiction of the courts and was
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courts made clear that the decline of jurisdiction was a discretionary act of adjudicatory comity given effect through the application
of the domestic sovereign's own law, and not as the result of any
international obligation.91
3.3.3.

Forum non conveniens comes of age in the U.S. federal
courts: the recognition of common law jurisdictional
discretion in in personam actions

3.3.3.1.

The situation prior to International Shoe v.
Washington

Prior to 1945, the expansive notions of jurisdiction found in the
courts of admiralty were not present in the courts of law and equity. In 1877, in Pennoyer v. Neff,92 the Supreme Court strictly
linked the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction by a court to the
93 While a court posgeographic limits of its sovereign territory.
sessed jurisdiction over any persons and property within those
94
boundaries, it was otherwise without jurisdiction. As Allan Stein
has pointed out, this linking of jurisdiction and territoriality "created a system in which there was little or no concurrent jurisdiction
between states" 95 - let alone between the United States and foreign
sovereigns. As a result, the conditions that led to the steady development of forum non conveniens in the admiralty courts were not
present in the courts of law and equity.96 With the Court's land-

carefully molded to insure that there would be some remedy in every case while
maintaining the comity of nations whose ships and subjects might be involved.").
91 See, e.g., Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 421
(1932) (stating that admiralty courts had an "unqualified discretion" to decline
jurisdiction in suits between foreigners "in the interests of justice"). As a matter of
international law, because jurisdiction and venue properly lay in the U.S. admiralty courts there is no international legal obligation on the U.S. court to decline to
hear the case before it in deference to the courts of another sovereign. Conversely,
because no obligation to defer lay upon the admiralty courts of the domestic sovereign, no deference may be demanded as of right by the courts of another.
Hence, the only condition under which deference would be granted was as a result of the application of the domestic forum's own law.
92 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
94

Id. at 722.
Id.

95

Stein, supra note 81, at 802.

93

Id.
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mark decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,97 however,
that changed.
International Shoe rewrote the constitutional rules for the assertion of personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts. Out went the strict territorial theory of jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer and in came the
idea of "minimum contacts." 98 No longer was personal jurisdiction
simply an expression of the territorial limits of the sovereign. 99
Now the assertion of personal jurisdiction encompassed a complex
balance of the sovereign's interest in the conduct at issue, the relative convenience of holding trial in the jurisdiction, the foreseeability of trial within the jurisdiction, and the notion that if a defendant
had availed him- or herself of the forum's laws the forum's assertion of jurisdiction was equitable. 100 Almost overnight, the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. courts, state and federal, had drastically expanded. With it came the problem of federal and truly
international parallel proceedings.
3.3.3.2. Adjudicatory Comity at the Roots of the Adoption of
Forum Non Conveniens in the Federal Courts
Confronted with this newly expansive notion of jurisdiction,
the federal courts suddenly faced cases in which, despite the fact
that jurisdiction was proper, the interests of justice compelled the
conclusion that the case would more appropriately be heard in a
foreign forum. But how to rationalize the existence of discretion to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction admittedly possessed? Enter adjudicatory comity once again- this time expressed in the terms of a
doctrine of forum non conveniens applicable in the courts of law and
equity -to provide a basis for a domestic court to defer jurisdic-

97

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

98 International Shoe, 326

U.S. at 316.
99 Nevertheless, notwithstanding the "minimum contacts" test set forth in
International Shoe, territoriality as a basis for personal jurisdiction does live on
through the continued acceptance of so-called "tag" jurisdiction, described by Justice Scalia as having a particular "pedigree" in U.S. jurisdictional jurisprudence.
Burnham v. Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.); See also James
Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territorialityin Judicial Jurisdiction, 37 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1, 53-54 (1992) (discussing Scalia's analysis in Burnham).
100 See Stein, supra note 81, at 803 (outlining the balancing test).
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tion in deference to the courts of another sovereign, when the interests of justice so demanded. 10 1
When the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in the federal courts in 1947102 - only two years after International Shoe-it did not make any direct references to "comity"
in its decisions.10 3 Nevertheless, when one reads the court's decisions in those cases, it is clear that adjudicatory comity serves as
the founding principle for the court's acceptance of the doctrine. In
Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Co., for example, the Court endorsed the principle that, notwithstanding the Congressional grant of jurisdiction
and venue to the lower federal courts, a federal district court nevertheless had the power-as a matter of common law-to dismiss
an ordinary action for damages on the ground that trial in the
courts of another jurisdiction would be more appropriate in the interests of justice. This was true even though the plaintiff had fully
complied with the rules of venue and jurisdiction in the domestic
forum. 104
Quoting Justice Brandeis' opinion in CanadaMalting Co. v. Patterson Steamships, an admiralty case which had involved the application of forum non conveniens to the courts of a foreign nation, the
Court in Gilbert observed:
This Court, in one form of words or another, has repeatedly recognized the existence of the power to decline
jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. As formulated by
Mr. Justice Brandeis the rule is:
Obviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true;

101 Cf Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J.
1234, 1234 (1947) (arguing that the expansion of constitutional assertions of personal jurisdiction led to the development of the forum non conveniens doctrine).
102 Prior to recognizing the application of the doctrine in actions at law in the
federal courts in Gilbert and Koster, the Court had considered the nature of the
doctrine in a number of earlier cases arising in different contexts. See, e.g., Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U.S. 413 (1932) (admiralty); Broderick v.
Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) (state court proceedings).
103 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens
Mutual Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
104 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507. The specific questions before the Court were
"whether the United States District Court has inherent power to dismiss a suit
pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, if so, whether that power
was abused in this case." Id. at 502.
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else the admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the ground that the litigation is between
foreigners. Nor is it true of courts administering
other systems of our law. Courts of equity and of
law occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to
exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between
aliens or nonresidents, or where for kindred reasons
the litigation can more appropriately be conducted
05
in a foreign tribunal.
In the view of the Court, then, congressional grants of jurisdiction and venue were to be read against the backdrop of the common law,
and the common law included an inherent discretion to decline jurisdiction because a particular court was not the most appropriate
10 6
for trial.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court patently rejected Justice
Black's dissenting contention that as a matter of constitutional law
"'the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment
and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which
their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or
duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction." ' 107 Instead, the
Court held that "[t]he principle of forum non conveniens is simply
that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when
jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute." 10 8 In essence, the Court in Gilbert agreed with Lord Sumner's
conclusion in Societe du Gaz de Paris-one of the original Scottish
cases -that notwithstanding the court's duty to entertain an action,

105 Id. at 504 (quoting Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. 285
U.S. 413, 422 (1932)). Gilbert, of course, was not an international case. There, the
dispute concerned whether the case should be heard in either Virginia or New
York. Nevertheless, as shown below, the principles settled by Gilbert with respect
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens have been held by the Court to apply in
cases in which the possible alternative forum is the court of a foreign sovereign.
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981) (providing an example where the alternative forum was Scotland).
106 See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507 (describing the problem as "a very old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the rights of the litigants). See
also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-717 (1996) (discussing the
common law backgrounds of both the federal abstention doctrines and the doctrine of forum non conveniens).
107 See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 513 (Black, J. dissenting) (quoting Hyde v. Stone, 20
How. 170, 175 (1857)).
108Gilbert,330 U.S. at 507.
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that duty "can be no higher than its duty to listen to, and if circumstances warrant, to sustain the plea [of forum non conveniens]." 10 9
As in Hilton, however, the Supreme Court in Gilbert did not end
its inquiry with a general recognition of the need for a comitybased discretion. Instead, the Court went on to craft a set of rules
designed to address the new class of cases faced by the federal
courts. In short, the principles of adjudicatory comity called for
different application inforum non conveniens cases than they had in
foreign enforcement cases. In the case of foreign judgment enforcement, as we have seen, the Court embraced a framework of
analysis that reflected a preference for the enforcement of foreign
judgments over the exercise of jurisdiction to hear cases anew in
the domestic forum. In the main, the Court in Hilton determined
that justice is better served by extending adjudicatory comity to the
judgment of a foreign court, rather than permitting the re-litigation
of the merits of the matter in a domestic court through a full exercise of its admitted jurisdiction to do so.
In the forum non conveniens situation, however, the Court found
a different set of circumstances. In cases involving forum non conveniens, no party had yet initiated an action in a foreign forum-let
alone a court reducing such action to judgment. 1 0 Thus, the principle basis for the preferred deference in the foreign judgment enforcement situation is absent. Accordingly, in Gilbert the Court
adopted the presumption that a plaintiff who has established the
domestic court's jurisdiction and venue over the parties and the
subject matter of the dispute should rarely have his or her choice of
forum disturbed, unless -and here the presumption may be rebutted- upon a balance of identified interests, the domestic court concludes that the interests of justice demand that the action be tried
in an adequate, available, alternative forum.'1 1

109 Societe of Paris du Gaz de Paris v. Societe Anonyme de Navigation "Les
Armateurs Francais" [hereinafter Societe du Gaz de Paris], [1926] S.C. 13, 21 (H.L.
1925) (opinion of Lord Sumner) (emphasis added).
110 As to the idea that in principle this need not be so, see infra Section 4.3.
111See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (listing interests and factors to be used by the
court in applying forum non conveniens); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 241 (giving factors which a court may consider in using its discretion to
dismiss a case).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

3.3.4.

[Vol. 27:3

American Dredging Company v. Miller: confirmation
of the constitutionalityof forum non conveniens

In 1948, following the decision in Gilbert, Congress enacted the
federal venue transfer statute-28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)-which supplanted the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens in cases
112
where the alternate forum was another federal district court.
The doctrine, however, remains applicable in cases in which the
more appropriate forum is a foreign court. Indeed, as the law now
stands, federal courts will defer only to the courts of a foreign na1 13
tion under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Significantly, the Supreme Court's most recent forum non conveniens case-American Dredging Co.U14 -reconfirms not only the
continuing applicability of the doctrine as a matter of common law
but also its firm constitutionality when applied by the federal
courts. The case makes for striking reading. In discussing the
jurisprudential pedigree of the doctrine, the Court describes the
doctrine as a "federal common-law venue rule," allowing a federal
district court to "determin[e] which among various competent
courts will decide the case."1 1 5 That is, although a U.S. court may
possess the power to exercise jurisdiction over a matter brought before it, nevertheless a common law, "self-imposed restraint upon
an authority actually possessed" 116 allows the U.S. court to decline
to exercise that power in the interests of justice where there is a
foreign court capable of exercising jurisdiction over the matter.
American Dredging thus represents a firm, if unspoken, recognition
that the foundations of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the
discretion wielded by the courts in its name are rooted in historical
principles of common law adjudicatory comity. It also stands for
the proposition that the U.S. Constitution permits the federal
112 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) (discussing Congressional intent when adopting §1404). Under section 1404(a), "[d]istrict courts were
given more discretion to transfer ... than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens." PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 253.
113 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 253. (providing an example where the
alternative forum, Scotland). See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,
449 n. 2 (1994) ("As a consequence [of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)], the federal doctrine of
forum non conveniens has continuing application only in cases in where the alternative forum in abroad.").
114

510 U.S. 443 (1994).

115

Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 113 (1890).

116
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courts to exercise such discretion in deference to a foreign court
even where the U.S. action fully complies with the letter of Congress's venue and jurisdictional enactments.
4. THE RECOGNITION OF ADJUDICATORY COMITY AS THE BASIS FOR
COMMON LAW DISCRETION TO DECLINE JURISDICTION IN FOREIGN

LIS ALIBI PENDENS CASES

In the preceding Section, we traced the path of comity as it entered the common law, first as a justification for applying foreign
legislative acts, and second as a justification for discretionary deference in federal court to foreign judicial action, viz., foreign judgments and foreign jurisdiction to adjudicate a case. Viewed as a
continuum, the next logical step in the development of the role of
adjudicatory comity would be for the federal courts to use its principles to craft a doctrine to address pending, parallel proceedings
in foreign courts. As discussed briefly at the outset, however, and
in greater detail in Section 5, infra, while the federal courts have
made some tentative steps in that direction, those steps have not
been satisfactory.
The U.S. state courts, however, have led the way. Faced with
the problem of parallel proceedings, U.S. state courts have embraced common law principles of comity to justify the dismissal or
stay of parallel cases before their courts. Moreover, U.S. state
courts have used principles of comity to develop practical tests for
determining when a stay or dismissal should be issued. In this
Section, I trace this development in the state courts.
4.1. Early Efforts to Address the Problem of Foreign Lis Alibi
Pendens: The Limited Scope of the Common Law Plea of
Abatement
The common law was initially mixed in its response to the
problem of foreign parallel proceedings because of the existence of
a common law, affirmative defense known as the "plea of abatement." Under the plea, a party was entitled to a dismissal without
prejudice of the action before the court wherever it could show that
another action (a) by the same plaintiff against the same defendant
(b) for the same cause of action (c) had been brought earlier (d) in a
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court of the same sovereign. 117 The grant of the plea had nothing to
do with adjudicatory comity. Instead, where the technical requirements were met, abatement was available as a matter of right;
there was no discretion in the court to deny the plea. 118 Although
concerned with parallel proceedings in the same jurisdiction, the
common law plea also had an impact on parallel proceedings in
foreign jurisdictions. Indeed, where the technical requirements of
the plea were not met, such as where the parallel proceeding was
pending in a foreign jurisdiction, abatement was prevented by its
very terms. Nor was there thought to be any discretion in the
court to grant an abatement in such a situation. 119 As the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania put the rule, in language that would have
been acceptable in every state, "[w]hether upon the principle of
comity between sister states, or convenience, the pendency of a
personal action [in the courts of another sovereign] may not be
pleaded in abatement." 120 A fortiori, the plea was likewise unavail121
able where the pending suit was filed after the domestic suit, involved different parties, 122 or where the roles of the parties were
123
reversed from the domestic action.
117 See Sparry's Case, (1591) 77 Eng. Rep. 61, 61-62 (Exch.) (holding that an
action pending before the King's Bench would abate a subsequent action brought
in the Exchequer).
118 See, e.g., Walsh v. Durkin, 12 Johns. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1815) (providing an example of case where the court recognized this lack of discretion).
119 See, e.g., Urlin v. Hudson, (1685) 23 Eng. Rep. 502 (Ch.) (denying abatement where first action was brought in a foreign court).
120 Irvine v. Lumbermen's Bank, 2 Watts. & Serg. 190, 219-20 (Pa. 1841) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Grider v. Apperson & Co., 32 Ark. 332, 335 (1877); Hatch
v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 488 (1853); Chadwick v. Gill, 141 A. 618, 619 (Del. Ch.
1928); Singer v. Scott, 44 Ga. 659, 660-61 (1872); McJilton v. Love, 13 Ill.
486, 494
(1851); Salmon v. Wootton, 39 Ky. 422, 423 (1840); Lindsay v. Lamed, 17 Mass.
190, 197 (1821); Goodall v. Marshall, 11 N.H. 88, 99 (1840); Kerr v. Willets, 48
N.J.L. 78, 79 (1886); Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns. 221 (1812); A.M. Sloan & Co. v.
McDowell, 75 N.C. 29, 33 (1876); J.P. Cnatzel & Co. v. Bolton, 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord)
33 (1825); Drake v. Brander, 8 Tex. 351, 357 (1852); accord, Insurance Co. v. Brune's
Assignee, 96 U.S. 588, 592 (1877); Shaw v. Lyman, 79 F. 2, 4 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1896);
Foster v. Vassall, (1747) 24 Eng. Rep. 1138, 1139-40 (Ch.).
121 Bussard v. Marshall, 14 U.S. 215, 217 (1816) (Story, J.).
122 See, e.g., Casey v. Harrison, 13 N.C. 244, 245 (1829) (explaining that the
pendency of another suit with a different plaintiff is not cause for abatement).
123 Certain Logs of Mahogany, 5 F. Cas. 374, 375 (C.C.D. Mass. 1837) (Story,
J.) ("[T]he plea of a prior lispendens applies ... not to cases, where there are cross
suits by a plaintiff in one suit, who is defendant in another."); Wood v. Lake, 13
Wis. 84, 92 (1860) ("[I]t is not sufficient that they be the same persons, but they
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Note that in this quote, the Pennsylvania court refers to the
problem in terms of its "sister states," and not other nations. The
careful reader may thus question the relevance of state common
law cases to the question of truly international lis alibi pendens
cases. But these cases are relevant. First, the state courts saw
themselves, for purposes of jurisdiction, as separate nation states.
At root, their conception of jurisdiction hearkened back to Huber's
early maxims that all sovereign power was territorial in nature and
that the nature of the sovereign's power could not extend beyond
its borders. 124 As the Supreme Court of New Jersey put it in a case
in which the prior action was pending just across the Hudson
River in a court in New York:
The true reason is that every country is sovereign and unrestricted in its powers, legislative, judicial and executive,
and hence does not acknowledge the right of any other nation to hinder its own sovereign acts and proceedings. If
the suit is abated here, it may be that no adequate remedy
can be had in the other jurisdiction. We do not know the
mode of trial there, the rules of evidence, the statutes pertaining to limitation or usury, or what kind of judgment
and satisfaction will be had, or whether if satisfaction can
be had, it may not be upon terms inimical to the policy of
our laws. Duty to its citizens forbids that a state shall send
jurisdiction, and constrain him to
the suitor out of its own
125
seek justice elsewhere.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court declared as early as 1858 that
courts of the various states of the Union are to be treated as foreign

must be the same as plaintiffs and defendants; and if their position in this respect be
reversed, the plea will be bad.") (emphasis added). Substantively, the same rules
applied to actions brought in equity as well as in cases in which the prior action
was pending in a federal court. See, e.g., Pierce v. Feagans, 39 F. 587, 588 (C.C.E.D.
Mo. 1889); Blake v. Barnes, 12 N.Y.S. 69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890); see also The Kongsli,
252 F. 267, 270 (D. Maine 1918) (explaining that prior filed in personam action
would not abate later-filed action in admiralty).
124 See, e.g., Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.) 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 ("Territorial
sovereignty is, in general, a situation recognised and delimited in space, either by
so-called natural frontiers as recognised by international law or by outward signs
of delimitation that are undisputed, or else by legal engagements entered into between interested neighbours, such as frontier conventions, or by acts of recognition of States within fixed boundaries.").
125 Kerr v. Willetts, 2 A. 782, 783 (N.J. 1886).
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to one another as the courts of different countries. 126 As Justice
Curtis put it while riding circuit:
Though the constitution and laws of the United States require, that the judgments rendered in one state shall receive
full faith and credit in another, yet, in respect to all proceedings prior to judgment, the courts of the different
states, acting under different sovereignties, must be considered as so far foreign to each other, that a remedy sought by
judicial proceedings under one, cannot be treated as a mere
and simple repetition of a remedy sought under another. 127
In any event, in the face of the strict limitations of the plea of
abatement, a number of early courts questioned whether there
might not exist some other basis for allowing a domestic court to
defer its exercise of jurisdiction in cases of foreign parallel proceedings.128 Looking for such a basis, some early courts interpreted the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution to mean that
the courts of the various states should consider themselves as being of the same sovereign, such that the rule of abatement would
apply. 129 This argument, however, never commanded broad support within the states 130 and was soon put to rest by the Supreme
1 31
Court decision referenced above.
Other courts contrived of exceptions to the strict application of
the requirements of the plea of abatement by focusing on particular
classes of cases, such as where a foreign court in the parallel pro126 See, e.g., Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884) (discussing parallel in
rem proceedings in state and federal courts); see also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S.
506, 516 (1858) (discussing the concept in the context of habeas corpus).
127 White v. Whitman, 29 F. Cas. 1029, 1029-1030 (C.C.D.R.I. 1852) (Curtis, J.)
(No. 17, 561); accord Salmon v. Wootton, 39 Ky. 422, 423 (1840); Seevers v. Clement, 28 Md. 426, 434 (1868) (explaining that states are essentially foreign to each
other in respect to their municipal relations).
128 See Lynch v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 17 F. 627, 628 (C.C.D.N.H. 1883) ("The
general rule is that a plea of lis
alibi pendens is not good when the litigation is in a
court of foreign jurisdiction. We may regret this, but it has been repeatedly so
held.... I am much inclined to think that courts of law will hereafter hold that
they may attain the same end through their power of postponing actions and suspending judgments.").
129 See, e.g., Hart v. Granger, 1 Conn. 154, 163 (1814).
130 See Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485 (1853) (overruling Hart v. Grangerand
describing how states are bound to respect the proceedings in other states).
131 See, e.g., Covell, 111 U.S. at 182 (1884) (discussing parallel in rem proceedings in state and federal courts).
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ceeding already had taken possession of property or issued a writ
of attachment.1 32 The courts justified these departures on the legal
fiction that where jurisdiction over a res had been exercised by a
foreign court, that exercise of jurisdiction acted physically, or at
least metaphysically, to remove the res from any possible exercise
of jurisdiction by the domestic court. While today we may question the need for such elaborate fictions, 133 the common law generally adopted these exceptions. Nevertheless, the exceptions have
not swallowed the rule. The common law has remained to this day
unyielding to any attempt to broaden the class of cases that may be
dismissed under the plea of abatement any further. In particular,
the plea still may not be used with respect to in personam foreign lis
alibi pendens actions.'3
132 Harvey v. Great N. R. Co., 52 N.W. 905, 906 (Minn. 1892) ("The pendency
of a prior action by foreign attachment in another jurisdiction, which binds the
debt, may always be set up by way of defense to a suit by the defendant in the attachment to recover the same debt. This constitutes an exception to the general
rule that lis pendens in a foreign court is not a good plea."). See, e.g., Embree v.
Hanna, 5 Johns. 101, 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (explaining that a person who has
been compelled to pay a debt once by a jurisdiction, should not be forced to pay
the same debt again in another jurisdiction).
133 Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 1106 ("[A]fter the fiction of in rem jurisdiction
has been drained of any force in the personal jurisdiction context, one can hardly
take seriously a rule that can be explained only by recourse to the in rem-in personam distinction.").
13 See, e.g., Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265,
271 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that a second court's failure to defer to the
first, where both have concurrent jurisdiction, is not the type of error that will
render future proceedings void); Sauter v. Sauter, 495 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1985) (holding that prior action was not a sufficient ground of abatement
in a marital dissolution context); McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowellWellman Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 1970) (discussing the right of stay of
an action in Delaware where a prior action was already pending in Alabama);
Farmers Union Coop. Elevator & Shipping Ass'n v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co.,
398 P.2d 571, 572-73 (Kan. 1965) (describing the lack of right to abatement in the
context of an elevator explosion policy); Dotson's Adm'r v. Ferrell, 169 S.W.2d
320, 321 (Ky. 1942) (explaining the issue in the context of the construction of a
will); Fitch v. Whaples, 220 A.2d 170, 172 (Me. 1966) (explaining the issue in a
breach of contract suit); Barker v. Eastman, 82 A. 166, 169 (N.H. 1912) (describing
the issue in a case involving two bills of equity involving rights growing out of a
will); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 668 A.2d 67, 71-72 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995) (involving a suit brought against liability insurers regarding
environmental claims); Beneke v. Tucker, 176 P. 183, 185 (Or. 1918) (involving a
suit related to the recovering of a note and a mortgage foreclosure); Singer v. Cha,
550 A.2d 791, 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the pendency of a negligence
action of a physician in one state did not preclude the patient from bringing an in
personam action in another state); Mills v. Howard, 228 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. Civ.
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4.2. A Solution Found: Adjudicatory Comity as the Justificationfor
Common Law, Discretionary Limits on the Exercise of Jurisdiction in ForeignLis Alibi Pendens Cases
With the requirements for the plea of abatement so firmly fixed
in the common law, state courts looked outside of the plea to
common law principles of adjudicatory comity to justify the exercise of a discretionary power to stay, rather than dismiss, a domestic action in the face of a foreign lis alibi pendens. While Story, in an
early case, wondered whether such discretionary power existed,
nineteenth century state court judges swiftly recognized that the
discretion to stay a domestic proceeding in deference to a foreign
lis alibi pendens was as much within the power of the court as it was
to create the common law rules of abatement requiring the mandatory dismissal in deference to a domestic lis alibi pendens. 135 In
1825, for example, in J.P. Cnatzel & Co. v. Bolton, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals endorsed the principle that where a pending foreign in personam action would "affect the rights" to be determined
in an action pending in the domestic court, it was well within the
power of the domestic court to stay its own proceedings to await
the determination by the foreign court, which could then be plead
as either collateral estoppel or res judicata. 136 Similarly, in 1886, in
Kerr v. Willetts - the same decision of the New Jersey Supreme
Court cited above for its refusal to abate a New Jersey action in favor of a pending action in New York-the court went on to add
that even though the plea of abatement was not available in an in
personam case of foreign lis alibi pendens, "[t]he pending suit in the

App. 1950) (involving the modification of a divorce decree); Power Train, Inc. v.
Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293, 1294 (Utah 1976) (discussing the issue in context of an allegedly tortuous misrepresentation of inventors in a patent).
135 See Wadleigh v. Veazie, 28 F. Cas. 1319, 1320 (C.C.D. Me. 1838) (No.
17,031) (expaining the absolute lack of discretionary authority in cases of this
sort). Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns. 221 (N.Y. 1812) ("The pendency of a suit in a foreign
court, by the same plaintiff against the same defendant, for the same cause of action, is no stay or bar to a new suit instituted here.") (second emphasis added);
Conrad v. Buck, 21 W.Va. 396, 404 (1883) (reaffirming that the pendency of a suit
in a foreign court will not entitle a party to a stay in the context of a partnership
dispute).
136 J.P. Cnatzel & Co. v. Bolton, 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 33, 38 (1825).
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foreign jurisdiction may furnish ground for staying the suit
here .... "137
What accounted for the recognition at common law of the discretionary judicial power to stay a domestic in personam proceeding
in deference to a foreign lis alibi pendens? It was recognition of the
principles underlying the extension of comity in other situations
(e.g., foreign judgment enforcement and forum non conveniens) that
also are implicated in cases of international parallel proceedings.
That is, although the domestic sovereign's courts may have the
power to affect their jurisdiction in a given case, the principles of
comity justify those courts to exercise a self-imposed restraint and
defer the exercise of that jurisdiction in order to do justice in individual cases. In short, a court which has had its jurisdiction invoked, also has the duty to determine under principles of adjudicatory comity whether such jurisdiction should be limited or
declined. 138 In the context of a foreign lis alibi pendens, the need to
do justice means a recognition that parallel proceedings create the
same potential of injustice for litigants and the judiciary -if not
more -when they are pending in the courts of different sovereigns
the same sovereign
as when they are pending in the courts of 139
where the rule of abatement normally applies.
It is important to note that the state courts' motivation for recognizing this discretionary power was not merely a concern with
administrative matters for the court's convenience or maintaining
happy relations between sovereigns. Rather, the state courts patently were concerned with doing justice, and being seen to do justice in cases in which the courts' jurisdiction is invoked. In Simmons v. Superior Court, one of the leading cases in the state courts,
the California Court of Appeals offers one of the most thorough
137 Kerr v. Willetts, 2 A. 782, 783 (1886). Accord Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn.
alibi pendens "may be cause for staying
485, 499 (1853) (explaining that a foreign lis
proceedings").
138 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (describing the
common law power of the federal courts to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens); Societe du Gaz de Paris, [19261 Sess. Cas. 13, 21 (H.L. 1925) ("[Tlhe Court's
duty to entertain the suit can be no higher than its duty to listen to, and if circumstances warrant, to sustain the plea [of forum non conveniens].").
139 See Allentown Foundry & Mach. Works v. Loretz, 44 N.Y.S. 689, 690 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1897) (finding "no reason" why an in personam action pending in Massachusetts should not stay an in personam action in New York when, if the earlier
action had also be pending in New York, the plea of abatement would have applied).
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explanations for why, as a matter of common law, a trial court may
exercise adjudicatory comity in appropriate cases and defer its exercise of jurisdiction in favor of a foreign court, even where normal
common law rules of abatement are not satisfied:
While it is unquestionably the law that the pendency of a
prior action in another state between the same parties, involving the same cause of action does not entitle a party as
a matter of right to an abatement of a second suit, we think
it is equally true that it is within the discretion of the court
in which the second action is pending to stay the same until
after the decision of the first, and that the principle of comity
between the states calls for the refusal on the part of the
courts of this state to proceed to a decision before the termination of the prior action ....

The rule which forbids a later action in the same state between the same parties involving the same subject matter
[i.e., the rule of abatement] rests upon principles of wisdom
and justice, to prevent vexation, oppression and harassment, to pervent [sic] unnecessary litigation, to prevent a
multiplicity of suits - in short, to prevent two actions between the same parties involving the same subject matter
from proceeding independently of each other. We think
there is no distinction in reason or difference in principle between a case where a later action between the same parties
involving the same subject matter is commenced in the state
and a case where a later action between the same parties
involving the same subject matter is commenced in another
state. If proceedings should be stayed in the first case mentioned, it is in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigation, conflicting judgments, confusion
and unseemly controversy between litigants and courts.
Any and all of this may occur where the later action is
commenced in another state, as well as where it is commenced in the same state. 140
So compelling has the case been for the discretion to extend adjudicatory comity in in personam cases involving earlier-filed for140 Simmons v. Superior Court, 214 P.2d 844, 848-49 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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eign parallel proceedings, that every state court in the United States
that has considered the issue has recognized that the domestic trial
court has the discretion in in personam cases to exercise adjudicatory comity to stay its own proceedings in deference to the proceedings in a foreign court, whether that court be in another state or
141
another country.
141 See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Howington, 73 So. 550, 551 (Ala. 1916) (discussing the stay of a personal injury action because of pendency of the same action in the U.S. District Court); Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 99
P.3d 553, 560 (Alaska 2004) (discussing the doctrine of comity as one of deference
in the context of a contract breach suit in overlapping jurisdictions); Tonnemacher
v. Touche Ross & Co., 920 P.2d 5, 10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 132 P.2d 70, 98 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
774 (1943) (Philippines); Simmons v. Superior Court, 214 P.2d 844, 848-49 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mayer, 833 P.2d 60, 62 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992); Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485, 499 (1853); McWane Cast Iron Pipe
Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 1970); Bradley v.
Triplex Shoe Co., 66 A.2d 208, 210 (D.C. 1949); Robinson v. Royal Bank of Can.,
462 So.2d 101, 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Canada); Polaris Pub. Income Funds
v. Einhorn, 625 So.2d 128, 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Jones v. Warnock, 67 Ga.
484, 485 (1881); Solarana v. Indus. Elecs., Inc., 428 P.2d 411, 416 (Haw. 1967);
Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Brady, 907 P.2d 807, 811 (Idaho 1995); Wiseman v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 270 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971); Young v. Herald, 209
N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ind. App. 1965); Edward Rose Bldg. Co. v. Cascade Lumber Co.,
621 N.W.2d 193, 195-96 (Iowa 2001); Farmers Union Coop. Elevator & Shipping
Ass'n v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins.-Co., 398 P.2d 571, 574 (Kan. 1965); Dotson's
Adm'r v. Ferrell, 169 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Ky. 1942); Chapa v. Chapa, 471 So.2d 986,
988 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Fitch v. Whaples, 220 A.2d 170, 172 (Me. 1966); Coppage
v. Orlove, 278 A.2d 587, 588 (Md. 1971); Travenol Labs., Inc. v. Zotal, Ltd., 474
N.E.2d 1070, 1072 (Mass. 1985); Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Midwest Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 433 N.W.2d 140, 141-42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Brunton v. Floyd
Withers, Inc., 716 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Barker v. Eastman, 82 A.
166, 169 (N.H. 1912); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 668 A.2d 67, 7172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 775 A.2d 601, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (Venezuela); Dolbeer v.
Stout, 139 N.Y. 486, 489, 34 N.E. 1102, 1102 (1893); A.P. Youngblood, Inc. v. Banca
Commerciale Italiana, 164 N.Y.S. 285 (App. Div. 1917); Commercial Union Ins. Co.
v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Corp., 666 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Moody v.
Branson, 136 P.2d 925, 928 (Okla. 1943); Beneke v. Tucker, 176 P. 183, 185 (Or.
1918); Radio Corp. of Am. v. Rotman, 411 Pa. 630, 631, 192 A.2d 655, 657 (1963);
J.P. Cnatzel & Co. v. Bolton, 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 33 (1825); Space Master Int'l,
Inc. v. Porta-Kamp Mfg. Co., 794 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Power
Train, Inc. v. Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293, 1294 (Utah 1976); see also Sw. Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Thunder Basin Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Wyo. 1999) (discussing a declaratory
judgment action). In addition to these common law precedents, a number of state
legislatures have codified the courts' prior common law practice. See, e.g., 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-619 (2005); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3211(a)(4) (McKinney 1991) (displaying codification of common law in Illinois); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.12 (2005)
(displaying the codification of common law in North Carolina).
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4.3. The Application of Adjudicatory Comity in Practice: The
Development of Specific Rules for the Exercise of Discretionin
Foreign Lis Alibi Pendens Cases
As has been noted from the outset, while principles of adjudicatory comity act as a jurisprudential explanation for why a domestic court may defer to another sovereign in certain cases, those
principles do not on their own dictate the specific analytical approach that a court should use to determine whether to forgo jurisdiction in any given case. Thus, while the courts at common law
have been uniform in their recognition of the applicability of adjudicatory comity and the discretion to decline or limit the exercise of
jurisdiction in cases of prior-pending parallel proceedings, the
courts have also had to consider by what rules and criteria that
discretion should be exercised. As we have seen, although principles of comity apply generally to many different classes of cases,
courts need to tailor the rules derived from comity to the factual
circumstances presented and the particular issues raised in a case.
Thus, in cases involving the enforcement of foreign judgments,
principles of adjudicatory comity counsel a presumptive deference
to the prior decision of a foreign court, while in the context of forum
non conveniens cases, the absence of prior pending action abroad results in a presumption in favor of the domestic court retaining jurisdiction over the case already before it.142 As Judge Wilkey
rightly observed in the Laker Airways case, "[clomity varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each claim for its recognition." 143 Viewed along the continuum of enforcement of
judgment cases and cases of forum non conveniens, the factual circumstances presented by a case of foreign lis alibi pendens fall
somewhere in the middle: there is as yet no foreign judgment, but
there is already a parallel action pending in another court.
In developing specific rules for foreign lis alibi pendens cases,
the state courts have avoided conflating the rules for such cases
142 For an interesting exploration of the idea that the principles underlying
foreign judgment enforcement and forum non conveniens might be brought even
closer together by the refusal of domestic courts to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments rendered in a forum that was a forum non conveniens in the first place,
see Adrian Briggs, Which Foreign Judgments Should We Recognise Today?, 36 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 240 (1987).
143 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
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with the rules applicable in cases of foreign judgment enforcement
or forum non conveniens. These courts have recognized that, because the factual circumstances of a lis alibi pendens case are different, so must the presumptions applicable in such cases be different.1 " Accordingly, every state court that has considered the issue
has concluded that, even though the presumption in a forum non
conveniens case may be in favor of retaining jurisdiction, that is not
the presumption that should apply in a case of a prior-pending
foreign lis alibi pendens. Instead, the uniformly accepted presumption in such cases is that a domestic court should ordinarily decline
to exercise jurisdiction where there is an earlier-filed action among
substantially the same parties and involving substantially the same
issues.1 45 As the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
144 See, e.g., McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co.,
263 A.2d 281, 283 & n.2 (Del. 1970) (holding that "discretion should be exercised
freely in favor of the stay when there is a prior action pending elsewhere" in contrast "with the rule that such discretion is to be sparingly used in a forum non conveniens case where there is no prior action pending elsewhere").
145 See Matanuska Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 99 P.3d 553,
560 (Alaska 2004) ("The doctrine of comity teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of litigation, have had an
opportunity to pass upon the matter."); Simmons v. Superior Court, 214 P.2d 844,
848 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) ("[Tlhe principle of comity between the states calls for the
refusal on the part of the courts of this state to proceed to a decision before the termination of a prior action...."); McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. 263 A.2d at 283 & n.
2 (Del. 1970) ("[D]iscretion should be exercised freely in favor of the stay when
there is a prior action pending elsewhere, in a court capable of doing prompt and
complete justice, involving the same parties and the same issues."); Polaris Pub.
Income Funds v. Einhorn, 625 So.2d 128, 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) ("Principles
of comity between sovereigns suggest that a court of one state should stay a proceeding pending before it on grounds that a prior-filed case involving substantially the same subject matter and parties is pending in another state's courts.");
Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 433 N.W.2d 140,
141-42 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("Where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the
first to acquire jurisdiction generally has priority to decide the case ....); Cogen
Tech. v. Boyce Eng'g Int'l, Inc., 574 A.2d 1018, 1020 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.,
1990) cert. denied, 585 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1990) ("[Tlhere is ordinarily no reason to entertain subsequent local litigation paralleling an already instituted action in another state."); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Corp., 666
N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) ("The general rule is that when the jurisdiction of two courts is invoked concerning the same subject matter, the tribunal
whose power was first invoked acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other
tribunals, to adjudicate the matter."); Moody v. Branson, 136 P.2d 925, 928 (Okla.
1943) ("In such cases, a court should ordinarily decline to entertain jurisdiction of
the issue under the doctrine of comity."); Space Master Int'l, Inc. v. Porta-Kamp
Mfg. Co., 794 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. App. 1990) ("As a matter of comity ... it is the
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Court rightly put the distinction: the factual and legal situation
raised in "a 'comity-stay' analysis is qualitatively different from a
forum non conveniens analysis ....The general rule favors stays or
dismissals in comity-stay situations, in the absence of special equities. The general rule in a forum non conveniens analysis favors retention of jurisdiction, unless the forum is manifestly in appropriate." 146 Indeed, no state court that has considered the issue has
found to the contrary.
Appropriately, a number of state courts have gone beyond stating the general common law principle that adjudicatory comity
should be extended freely in cases of foreign lis alibi pendens and
sought to develop more detailed frameworks of analysis that may
be used by trial courts in determining whether the discretion to defer to a foreign action should be exercised in a given case. While
not citing Story, these courts seem to have recognized his warning
that although the principles of comity "would seem, therefore, to
stand on just principles ...from its generality, it leaves behind
many grave questions as to its application ....*"147 These courts
also appear to have been cognizant of the criticisms of applications
of comity (adjudicatory or prescriptive) which note that unless
principles of comity are used to fashion legal rules that may be understood and applied by courts and litigants, mere invocations of
"comity" can lead to undesirable ad hoc decision-making.
The New Jersey courts have lead the way in constructing legal
rules for the treatment of foreign lis alibi pendens cases. In New Jersey, the appellate courts have constructed a framework of analysis
to address both cases of earlier- and later-filed parallel proceedcustom for the court in which the later action is instituted to stay proceedings
therein until the prior action is determined or, at least, for a reasonable time, and
the custom has practically grown into a general rule which strongly urges the
duty upon the court in which the subsequent action is instituted to do so.");
Teague v. Bad River Band, 612 N.W.2d 709, 719 (Wis. 2000) ("Ordinarily, a court
should not exercise jurisdiction over subject matter over which another court of
competent jurisdiction has commenced to exercise it.").
146 Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 668 A.2d 67, 72-73 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995). See, e.g., McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowellWellman Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 & n.2 (Del. 1970) (contrasting the rule that
"discretion should be exercised freely in favor of the stay when there is a prior action pending elsewhere" with "the rule that such discretion is to be sparingly exercised in a forum non conveniens case where there is no prior action pending
elsewhere").
147 STORY, supra note 34, § 37.
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ings. Under the New Jersey rule, once it is established that
(1) there is a first-filed action in another jurisdiction, (2) involving
similar parties, claims, and legal issues, and (3) in which the proponent of the later-filed domestic action will have the opportunity
for adequate relief, the burden of proof shifts to the party seeking
to bring the belated domestic action to establish that there are
"special equities" that nonetheless favor retention of the case by
the New Jersey court.1 48 These "special equities" include the
strength of the connection of the dispute to the respective forums,
whether deferring to the foreign forum would be prejudicial to
New Jersey public policy, how far advanced the foreign action is in
comparison to the later-filed New Jersey action, and the issue of
fairness to the parties. 149 In cases in which the foreign action has
been filed after the domestic action, conversely, the doctrine of forum non conveniens will apply.
New Jersey is not alone in adopting this basic approach with its
clear presumption in favor of avoiding duplicative domestic litigation. All of the other state courts that have considered the issue
have found that the temporal sequence of the filing of the domestic
and foreign suits acts as a predicate for determining whether the
legal presumption should be in favor of retaining jurisdiction in
the domestic court or deferring to the fcreign proceeding. 5 0 We
Am. Home Prod. Corp., 668 A.2d at 73-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995);
& Eng'g Co. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 775 A.2d 601, 611 (N.J. Super.
Research
Exxon
Ct. App. Div. 2001).
149 STORY, supra note 34, §§ 32-33. The list is non-exhaustive. Am. Home Prod.
Corp., 668 A.2d at 74 ("Other factors and interests, not yet specifically articulated
by our courts, also could present special equities.")
150 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Corp., 666 N.E.2d 571,
574 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) ("The general rule is that when the jurisdiction of two
courts is invoked concerning the same subject matter, the tribunal whose power
was first invoked acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other tribunals, to
adjudicate the matter."). Nevertheless, as noted in the text, the adequacy and
need for a "first-filed" predicate is an important issue, which we will discuss
shortly. See STORY, supra note 34, § 38. But see M.E. Jones, Inc. v. Arel Commc'n &
Software, Ltd., 2003 WL 1949786 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). In this unreported and
precedentially limited decision, a panel of the Ohio Court of Appeals appears to
have eschewed the application of a presumption in the exercise of their judicial
discretion and instead simply called for a balancing of identified interests by the
trial court when "nearly identical actions are underway in both an American court
and in a foreign court." Id. at *2. The factors considered under this approach are
essentially the same as those identified by the New Jersey court in American Home
Products, except that because there is no need for a predicate showing that the foreign action was filed first and involves similar parties, claims, and legal issues,
148
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will return to question of the importance of temporal sequence in
Section 5, when we discuss the structure of the discretion available
in foreign lis alibi pendens cases in the federal courts. For now,
however, it is sufficient to note the common law's universal recognition of the judicial discretion to apply adjudicatory comity to defer to parallel proceedings in the courts of a foreign sovereign, and
the determination that a domestic court should ordinarily do so in
cases in which there is a foreign lis alibi pendens.
5. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF FOREIGN Lis
ALIBI PENDENS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

As indicated above, the federal courts have begun to address
the question of foreign lis alibi pendens cases. However, none of the
three approaches that they have taken to date are fully satisfactory.
Moreover, the current state of affairs in the federal courts seems
anomalous when viewed against both prior federal court reliance
on comity-based discretion in similar cases and state court use of
comity-based discretion in cases of foreign lis alibi pendens. As we
have seen, since the earliest days of the Republic, U.S. courts (state
and federal) have recognized that common law principles of comity (prescriptive and adjudicatory) provide a basis for a domestic
court to exercise discretion to decline or limit the extension of domestic law (substantive or jurisdictional) in cases in which to do so
would be in the interests of justice. 151 Moreover, the state courts in
particular have recognized that this discretion is wholly applicable
in cases of international parallel proceedings. 5 2 Surely the issues
these two elements are placed into the general mix of factors to be balanced.
Thus the:
"factors to be balanced when determining whether to grant a
motion for stay or dismissal in favor of litigation in an overseas
forum.., are as follows: the similarity of parties and issues involved, promotion of judicial efficiency, adequacy of relief
available in the alternative [foreign] forum, considerations of
fairness to all parties and possible prejudice to any of them, and
the temporal sequence of filing for each action."
Id. (quoting Caspian Inv., Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 884
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). Obviously, an unreported decision by one panel of the Ohio
Court of Appeals, rendered expressly without precedential value, does not undermine the reported position of the Ohio courts, which makes a presumption in
favor of deference contingent upon the presence of an earlier-filed action.
151 See supra Section 3.
152 Id.
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and concerns that have prompted these state courts to recognize
discretion to exercise adjudicatory comity in foreign lis alibi pendens
cases also arise when the parallel proceeding is in a U.S. federal
court. Why, then, have the U.S. federal courts, before which so
many international cases come, been unable to arrive at the seemingly most obvious answer?
Examination of the three types of recent federal cases reveals
the problem. While every federal court that has considered the issue has assumed that the federal courts have some measure of discretion to decline or limit jurisdiction in deference to a foreign lis
alibi pendens, none has justified its discretion on the basis of a
sound understanding of comity. 153 Indeed, the federal courts are
either unwilling to recognize and/or are unaware of the historical
common law principles of comity that provide a constitutional basis for the exercise of discretionary power by the federal courts. In
other words, doctrinally speaking, the federal courts are in the
wrong place. And, being in the wrong place, the courts are busily
crafting rules that either pander to inappropriate concerns or, perhaps worse, are unbounded by any relevant, meaningful principles. After all, the manner in which a court exercises discretion
depends in large measure on the perceived basis of that discretion.
In this Section, I discuss each of the three factions, and the particular problems with their approaches. With respect to the first two
factions, discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, I conclude that the
courts are in the wrong place, doctrinally speaking, because they
have been distracted by inapt analogies. With respect to the third
faction, also discussed in Section 5.2, I highlight the drawbacks of
approaching the problem without a rigorous theoretical underpinning.
5.1. Faction One- The Abstentionists: Inapt Analogy to Abstention
Doctrine Leads to a Rule That is UnnecessarilyLimited
The first faction of federal courts, represented primarily by the
Seventh Circuit, have justified the application of a highly limited
discretionary power modeled upon the Supreme Court's restrictive
domestic abstention jurisprudence' 5 4 (specifically, Colorado River
Id.
See AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Nimelias Enterprises S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir.
2001) (exercising a highly limited discretionary power).
153
154
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Water Conservation District v. District Court15 5 and its progenylS 6). In
so doing, the courts have referenced "the interests of international
comity," 157 but have made no effort to explain what those interests
might be or how or why they result in the exercise of the limited
discretion the court believes is authorized. In Section 5.1.1, I discuss the abstention case law on which the "abstentionist" courts
rely, including the grounding of the abstention rules in federalism
concerns, and the resulting limited discretion to decline jurisdiction under the Constitution. In Section 5.2.1, I explain why common law, comity-based discretion is more appropriate in international cases and leads to better results.
5.1.1. Federal-stateabstention cases provide an inapt theoretical
framework for foreign lis alibi pendens cases
In a series of cases beginning in the 1940s,

158

the Supreme Court

155 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
156 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983) (citing Colo. River as the basis for the opinion).
157 AAR Int'l, Inc., 250 F.3d at 518. See Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he fact that the parallel
proceedings are pending in a foreign jurisdiction rather than in a state court is
immaterial."); Szabo v. CGU Int'l Ins., PLC, 199 F. Supp. 2d 715, 719 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (adopting the Seventh Circuit's approach); see also AI-Abood ex rel. AlAbood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying Colorado River
test).
158 While the Supreme Court has cautioned that "[t]he various types of abstention doctrines are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to
fit cases," Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987), the Court's abstention jurisprudence does lend itself to acceptable division by reference to the cases
in which the various types of abstention were first recognized. The chronology of
the Court's abstention jurisprudence thus begins with so-called "Pullman" abstention, derived from the Court's decision in Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 643 (1941). Pullman abstention is required where decision of a federal
constitutional issue can be avoided by deferring to a state court's resolution of an
unsettled state law issue. "Burford" abstention was developed two years later in
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Burford abstention is required where
the exercise of concurrent federal jurisdiction would disrupt a complex state regulatory regime. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959),
gave us the "Thibodaux" abstention, which is required, or at least permissible,
where a state law issue is unsettled and politically sensitive. "Younger" abstention is required where the federal defendant has commenced criminal or civil enforcement proceedings in state court against the federal plaintiff. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). "Colorado River" abstention, by far the most germane to
the subject of this Article, addresses the discretion of a federal court to defer in
limited circumstances to duplicative, ongoing state court litigation. Colo. River,
424 U.S. at 817.
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created various types of abstention doctrines that justified dismissal of a case, properly before a federal court, on the ground that
a state court constituted a better forum for the resolution of the
case. The Court's abstention doctrines were expressly motivated
by "considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations." 159 In Colorado River, on which the
Abstentionist Courts rely, the Supreme Court developed what has
become a particular strain of its domestic abstention jurisprudence,
basing its justification for abstention on what it characterized as
"considerations of '[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition
of litigation"' within the context of the U.S. federal system of gov160
ernment.
Notably, the Court in Colorado River disavowed the presence of
any specific federalism issues in the case at hand, which simply involved a concurrent proceeding in the state court. Thus, as a result
of this "absence of weightier considerations of constitutional adjudication and state-federal relations," 161 the Court emphasized that
in order to overcome the "virtually unflagging obligation of the
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them," 162 only "exceptional" circumstances would justify this new form of abstention. 163 As the Court subsequently described in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., relevant factors
include: (1) the convenience of the alternative fora; (2) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (3) the order in which the
cases were filed; (4) whether foreign or federal law will apply; (5)
the relative progress of the two actions; (6) whether the foreign action protects the federal plaintiff's rights; and (7) the vexatious or
contrived nature of the federal claim, "with the balance heavily
weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction." 1 64
Notwithstanding the Court's statement in Colorado River that
there were no "considerations of proper constitutional adjudication
159
160

Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817.
Id. at 817. (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S.

180 (1952)).
161
162
163
164

Id. at 818.
Id. at 817.
See id. at 818-19 (referencing the exceptional circumstances criterion).
Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15-16

(1985).
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and regard for federal-state relations" present in that case, 165 there
are nevertheless compelling reasons to view Colorado River as a
case whose reasoning is necessarily rooted in the Court's conception of federalism, and whose application thus should be limited to
domestic circumstances. Looking at Colorado River through a historical lens, Colorado River at bottom was an abatement case in
which the defendants had sought to abate (i.e., dismiss) the federal
action because of the proceedings pending in the state court, and
the district court had granted the "abatement" by dismissing the
federal case.
As a matter of the common law, and the Supreme Court's own
jurisprudence, this could never have been appropriate. 166 The common law, as we have seen, has always been strict in its requirements for a successful plea of abatement, demanding that the cases
be pending in courts of the same sovereign,167 and that the case
sought to be abated be the later-filed action. 168 Neither of these circumstances were present in Colorado River. Not only were the cases
pending in the courts of different sovereigns, but the federal pro169
ceeding sought to be abated was actually the first-filed action.
Thus, the Court undoubtedly was correct when it noted that the
general rule is that "the pendency of an action in the state court is
no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal
170
court having jurisdiction."
Given this acknowledgement of the limits of the common law
rule of abatement, if the Court had been inclined nevertheless to
endorse deference to the state court under common law principles,
one would have thought that it would have sought to root the district court's discretion in the either the doctrine of forum non conveniens (which would have allowed for a dismissal under the
Court's decision in Gilbert v. Gulf Oil) or would have looked to
cases involving adjudicatory comity in which, as we have seen,
courts have discretion to stay an action even if dismissal under
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817.
See, e.g., Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 554 (1876) ("[T]he pendency of a
prior suit in another jurisdiction is not a bar to a subsequent suit.").
167 See supra note 117-23 and accompanying text.
168 See id.
169 See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817 (stating the circumstances of the case).
170 Id. at 817 (citing McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910), 217 U.S. at
282) (emphasis added).
165

166
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abatement is inappropriate. 171 The Court took neither route. Instead, it proceeded almost without reference to the history of the
issue or the common law's treatment of such cases and chose to
craft a new branch of its domestic abstention jurisprudence to
permit a dismissal where the common law plainly would not have
done so.
The Court's recent decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance
Co. 1 72 suggests that this is an appropriate reading of Colorado River
and, moreover, that the present Court in not entirely comfortable
with the Colorado River decision, nor its follow-on case, Moses H.
Cone,173 in which the Court extended Colorado River to cover cases
in which the federal court had not dismissed the action before it,
but simply stayed its proceedings instead. In Quackenbush, the
Court drew a sharp distinction between a dismissal and a stay, reasoning that a stay involved no failure or refusal to exercise jurisdiction, while a dismissal plainly did, and that such failure or refusal
could be justified only in cases where the relief sought was equitable or otherwise discretionary. 74 The Court based its decision in
Quackenbush on the idea that a request for injunctive, declaratory,
or other equitable relief triggers the historical discretionary powers
of a court of equity, which could justify a decision not to exercise
jurisdiction resulting in dismissal, but that in the absence of the invocation of such equitable powers, a dismissal would not be appropriate in an in personam damages action. 75 At the same time,
the Court expressly indicated that its decision with respect to its
abstention doctrines did not affect its case law on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens (where dismissal is the normal course regardless of the nature of the relief sought), which the Court described
176
as "of a distinct historical pedigree."
The reasoning of Quackenbush raises a number of profound
questions about the continuing vitality of the Court's decisions in
Colorado River and Moses H. Cone. It is hard to reconcile the decision to dismiss in Colorado River with Quackenbush's holding that
171
172
173

See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15-16

(1985).
174
175
176

Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731.
See id. at 717-18 (stating the Court's basis for decision).
Id. at 721-22.
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the dismissal of an in personam action on abstention grounds is only
appropriate in cases in which the relief being sought is "equitable
or otherwise discretionary." 177 That, of course, was not the basis
for the decision in Colorado River. Indeed, Colorado River entirely
eschewed reliance on common law principles or the nature of the
federal action-even though the federal suit was a discretionary
action for declaratory relief -and instead, as we have seen, decided
the case on the basis of a new theory of abstention that purported
to justify a dismissal of the federal action. 178
The reasoning of Quackenbush throws the entire basis for that
decision into considerable doubt. And while it may require the
Court to address the interplay of Quackenbush and Colorado River in
federal-state parallel cases, such an apparent undercutting of the
rationale of Colorado River should at least dissuade the federal
courts from extending its holding outside of the domestic context
in which it was originally decided. Moreover, given that Colorado
River specifically dealt with the dismissal of an earlier-filed federal
action -and not the stay of a later-filed case as common law principles of adjudicatory comity counsel should be the approachthere is even less to commend a broad application of the Colorado
River framework in international lis alibi pendens cases.
With respect to the continuing vitality of Moses H. Cone, Quackenbush raises an even more serious question. In Moses H. Cone,
even though the lower court had only stayed its proceedings (as
opposed to dismissing the case), the Court justified its decision to
apply Colorado River's strict presumption against allowing deference to a pending state court proceeding on the ground "that a stay
is as much a refusal to exercise federal court jurisdiction as a dismissal." 179 In Quackenbush, however, the Court flatly rejected this
conclusion and, indeed, went to great pains to distinguish between
dismissals and stays, emphasizing that "an order merely staying
' 1 80
the action 'does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty."
Id. at 732.
Had the Court in Colorado River treated the case as one involving the discretion to decline jurisdiction where declaratory relief is requested, presumably
the Court might simply have cited Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495
(1942) (ruling that the district court has discretion to decline jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action where another suit is pending in state court), discussed
the impact of the federal statute present in ColoradoRiver, and called it a day.
179 Moses, 460 U.S. at 28.
180 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996) (quoting Louisi177
178
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This is undoubtedly correct both doctrinally and practically.
As a doctrinal matter, courts have long distinguished in principle
the decision to stay a matter from the decision to dismiss it. Indeed, that is one of the principle doctrinal distinctions that has allowed the common law to accept a lis alibi pendens stay based upon
adjudicatory comity in cases in which the more restrictive rule of
181 Moreover, as a practical matter, a
abatement would not apply.
stay versus a dismissal can mean the difference between satisfying
a statute of limitations deadline or facing a subsequent ruling that
the limitations period has expired. A stay in such cases retains the
jurisdiction of the staying court so that in the event that the alternate action does not proceed in a reasonably expeditious manner,
1 82 In
the staying court may lift its stay and proceed with the case.
Moses H. Cone, the Court-perhaps in a desire to assure that the
stay order at issue in that case would be immediately appealable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291183- simply breezed by these distinctions in
reaching its decision to equate a stay with a dismissal.
Quackenbush, however, implicitly disapproves of the Moses H.
Cone conflation and reaffirms that the distinctions between the decision to dismiss and the decision to stay are important because of
the common law background of the federal courts' jurisdictional
powers. Quackenbush thus calls into question the propriety of continuing to apply the Colorado River framework in stay cases because
the only reason for the Court's decision to apply the Colorado River
framework in Moses H. Cone was the Court's erroneous conclusion
1 4 This, of
that the stay in that case was equivalent to a dismissal.
course, has great bearing on the treatment of foreign lis alibi
pendens cases, where, as we have seen, the common law, adjudica-

ana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959)).
181 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., Tonnemacher v. Touche Ross & Co., 920 P.2d 5, 11 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1996) (discussing differences between a stay and dismissal in lis alibi pendens context).
183 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 30
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing one possible reason for equating a stay
with a dismissal).
184 Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, The United States' Approach to International Civil
Litigation: Recent Developments in Forum Selection, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 17
(1998) (arguing that as a result of Quackenbush, federal courts should cease applying the Colorado River analysis in international parallel proceedings cases).
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tory comity approach calls for a stay of the domestic action and not
85
a dismissal.
5.1.2.

The constitutionalityof discretion to extend adjudicatory
comity in foreign lis alibi pendens cases

All courts facing lis alibi pendens cases are concerned about the
constitutionality of a decision to dismiss or stay a case where jurisdiction properly lies in the federal court. This is true generally because "the federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction." 186
Instead, "they have only the power that is authorized by Article III
of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant
thereto." 187 In addition to this general proposition, one must also
consider the Supreme Court's statements on numerous occasions,
beginning with Justice Marshall's famous dictum in Cohens v. Virginia in 1821, that a federal court "has no right.., to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given" it by Congress. 188 Taking
these statements on their face, they would appear to leave little
room for the exercise of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction. Moreover, the abstentionist courts are even more likely to
heed such language, viewing the problem, as they do, through the
lens of federal-state relations. Indeed, Colorado River and its progeny echo these sentiments, making any court relying on such cases
especially cautious to exercise such discretion.
In addition to language from some court decisions, some commentators have argued forcefully that exercises of discretion by the
federal courts which limit or decline the exercise of jurisdiction
amount to impermissible "judicial lawmaking" and a "judicial
usurpation of legislative authority, in violation of the principle of
185 For a strong pre-Quackenbush critique of the Colorado River decision in
terms of the domestic abstention doctrine, see Rehnquist, supra note 4,at 1049.
186 Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
187 Id.
188 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, J.); see also
Kline v. Burk Consrt. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234-35 (1922) (stating that the federal or
state court with jurisdiction must proceed with the action); McClellan v. Carland,
217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910) (holding that when a federal court has jurisdiction, it may
not simply turn a portion of the matter over to a state court); Chicot County v.
Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) (stating that jurisdiction of federal courts may
not be transferred to state courts by state legislatures); Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 170, 175 (1857) (holding that federal courts must exercise jurisdiction in
cases where it exists, and that state legislatures cannot take this jurisdiction for the
states).
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separation of powers." 189 These academic arguments must be
taken seriously because they purport to be based not only in the
Court's own statements, but also in the structure of the Constitution. In answering them, it will not do to overcome their effect by
arguing that discretion by the federal courts to extend adjudicatory
comity should exist as a matter of sound political/legal theory. If
the federal courts have the power to exercise adjudicatory comity
in the first place, it must rest either in the power granted to the
federal courts by the Constitution and/or congressional jurisdictional statutes or in the powers historically held by the courts under common law. 190
However, as David Shapiro has pointed out, the central problem with the so-called "separation of powers" argument is that it
ignores the fact that the congressional grants of jurisdiction have
historically been understood as including significant amounts of
judicial discretion, which the federal courts exercise as part of their
common law powers. 191 This discretion "rounds out the edges of
189 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 115 (1984). See id. at 74 ("[N]either total nor partial
judge-made abstention is acceptable as a matter of legal process and separation of
powers.").
190 See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of JurisdictionalResequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2001) (grouping the bases for federal judicial power into three categories: express, implied, and inherent). "Express powers
are those immediately evident or directly derived from text [e.g., the Constitution
and federal jurisdictional statutes]," while "[i]mplied powers, by comparison, ...
are not outrightly conferred as such, but their existence manifestly corresponds to
one or more identifiable enumerated powers." Id. "Inherent powers, in contrast
with both express and implied powers, 'do not depend on the existence of any
textual assignment.' Rather than flowing from the text, they flow from the character or needs of-that is, they are inherent to -the governmental institution itself."
Id. (citation omitted). Using these classifications here, the powers derived from
principles of adjudicatory comity would fall within the category of "inherent
powers.
191 See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 545 (surveying a variety of areas in which the
federal courts exercise jurisdictional discretion as a matter of common law and
concluding that "suggestions of an overriding obligation.., are far too grudging
in their recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction"). See also
Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 1102-04 (examining the "faulty premise" of the Supreme Court's decision in ColoradoRiver). In addition to the direct applications of
judicial discretion to jurisdictional matters identified by Shapiro, Richard Matasar,
and Gregory Bruch have identified a host of areas in which the Supreme Court, as
a matter of common law lawmaking, has created procedural laws by which it
manages the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S.
Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal JurisdictionalPolicy, and Abandonment of the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1328-32
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jurisdictional enactments" 192 and reflects the power that courts
have held throughout Anglo-American legal history to balance the
duty to entertain an action-"judex tenetur impertiri judicium
suum" -with the equally important obligation to ensure that the
exercise of jurisdiction conferred is used to do justice. 193 Such exercises of discretion are not a betrayal of the text of the Constitution
or even a rejection of the general obligation of the federal courts to
decide the cases within their jurisdiction. Instead, they are a
deeply entrenched aspect of the judicial function, supported both
by the historical development of the U.S. legal system and contem94
porary judicial practice.
The discretion that Shapiro describes is not an unfettered discretion that would allow the federal courts to hear cases at their
pleasure, but a "principled discretion," whereby the courts act
based upon "criteria drawn from the relevant statutory or constitutional grant of jurisdiction or from the tradition within which the

(1986); see, e.g., Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91, 93, 99 (1931) (showing
an example for the allocation of authority between judges and juries); Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300 (1876) (showing an example for
charging the jury); Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139-41 (1854) (showing an example for joinder of necessary or indispensable parties); Cooke v. Woodrow, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 13, 14 (1809) (showing an example for evidence); Logan v.
Patrick, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 288 (1809) (showing an example for service of process);
Mandeville v. Wilson, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 15 (1809) (showing an example for pleadings); Radford v. Craig, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809) (showing an example for default judgments); Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320 (1796) (showing an example for service of process).
192 Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdictionand Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1891, 1893 (2004).
193 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (describing the
common law power of the federal courts to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens); Societe du Gaz de Paris, [1926] Sess. Cas. 13, 21-22 (H.L. 1925) (Scot.) (Opinion of Lord Sumner) ("[T]he Court's duty to entertain the suit can be no higher
than its duty to listen, then, if the circumstances warrant it, to sustain the plea [of
forum non conveniens].").
194 In a way, demanding proof of the legitimacy of the judicial discretion to
apply principles of comity (prescriptive or adjudicatory) that the federal courts
have been exercising from the early days of the Republic is almost a non-sequiter.
At a certain point the legitimacy of the power to exercise discretion may be
founded upon the history of the custom itself and, one might note, congressional
acquiescence in that custom. See Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving
Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 137-44 (1984) (discussing explicit
versus implicit acquiescence and the use of objections by the legislative and executive branches of the federal government).
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The idea that the common law forms a dygrant arose . ."195
namic part of the exercise of federal jurisdiction should not be controversial or surprising. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized on many occasions that the congressional grants of
need to be understood against the
jurisdiction to the federal courts
196
law.
backdrop of the common
As we have seen, part of that common law history and tradition, tracing roots back to before the Founding, are the principles of
adjudicatory comity in international cases. Whether in an action to
enforce a foreign judgment or to dismiss a case under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, common law principles of adjudicatory
comity vest in the federal courts the power to exercise discretion in
in personam actions to determine whether congressionally conferred jurisdiction should be limited or declined in the interests of
justice. 197 This power to apply principles of comity is appropriately- in the absence of positive legislative action to the contrary a judicial one and seems to have existed in the common law since
principles of comity entered the common law in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. As Story concluded from his review of preConstitution case law in 1834, and as was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot:
In England and America the courts of justice have hitherto exercised the same authority [to determine whether to
extend comity] in the most ample manner; and the legislatures have in no instance (it is believed) in either country interfered to provide any positive regulations. The common
law of both countries has been expanded to meet the exi198
gencies of the times as they have arisen ....
195 Shapiro, supra note 4, at 578.
196 See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452 (1994) (describing
the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a common law "supervening venue provision"); Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507 (describing the common law power of the federal
courts to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens). See also Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (discussing the common law background
of the federal abstention doctrines and the doctrine of forum non conveniens).
197 See supra Section 5.1.2.
198 Story, supra note 34, § 24. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895)
(quoting Story's Commentaries and stating further that with respect to the decision
whether or not comity should be extended "the duty still rests upon the judicial
tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to do so, in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly
brought before them").
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5.2. Factions Two and Three - The Landites and the
Internationalists: Unexplained Reliance on Landis v. North
American Co. and the Eleventh Circuit'sMurky Doctrine of
"InternationalAbstention"
Even though the Colorado River analysis is not appropriate for
cases addressing the stay of a federal court proceeding in deference
to a foreign lis alibi pendens case, it must be said that the analytical
approach taken by those courts, which have based the exercise of
discretion on the Supreme Court's decision in Landis v. North
American Co.199 concerning parallel proceedings in two different
federal courts is little more satisfactory. As noted above, a number
of courts have sought to link "the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants" 200 described in Landis with unexplained references to "international comity." In so doing, these
courts have held that notwithstanding the precedent of Colorado
River in the federal-state context, 201 a stay or dismissal of U.S. proceedings in deference to a foreign lis alibi pendens is within the trial
court's discretion as exercised through a balancing of various factors, including the similarity of the parties and issues involved, the
promotion of judicial efficiency, the adequacy of relief available in
the alternative forum, considerations of fairness to the parties and
possible prejudice, and the temporal sequence of the filing of each
action. 20 2 In a similar vein, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has developed an analytical framework that it has labeled "interna-

199 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
200

Id. at 254.

See, e.g., Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1993) (granting stay
because of pending action in foreign jurisdiction); Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int'l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting stay because of pending
action in foreign jurisdiction); Caspian Inv. Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings Ltd., 770 F.
Supp. 880, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (commenting that federal courts may decline to
exercise jurisdiction when case is pending in a foreign jurisdiction); Brinco Mining
Ltd. v. Federal Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1982) (providing an example
where a U.S. federal court deferred to a foreign court with action pending).
202 See, e.g., Caspian Invs. Ltd., 770 F.Supp. at 884-85 (explaining relevant considerations of a federal court when determining whether or not to exercise jurisdiction when a case is pending in a foreign court); Ronar Inc. v. Wallace, 649
F.Supp. 310, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (giving an example of a federal court abstaining
from exercising jurisdiction when proceeding is under way in a foreign court).
201
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tional abstention," 2 3 identifying three principles apparently meant
to control the district court's decision to defer to foreign proceedings: "(1) a proper level of respect for the acts of our fellow sovereign nations-a rather vague concept referred to in American juto litigants; and (3)
risprudence as international comity; (2) "fairness
2 °4
efficient use of scarce judicial resources.
Even if these cases rested on more solid doctrinal footing, i.e., if
they recognized that the power of discretion that they are exercising is a common law power of adjudicatory comity-the approaches offered by these courts would still not be satisfying because they fail to provide meaningful guidance for the decision of
individual cases. To be sure, these cases identify a host of factors
to be balanced, but the balancing itself is completely ad hoc. To
take the Eleventh Circuit's "international abstention" approach, for
example, in the only case in which that court has addressed in
25
depth the application of its new abstention doctrine, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the district court had properly issued a stay because (a) "the district court found no evidence that the [foreign]
court was not competent to hear the claims or would not use fair
and just proceedings in deciding the case," (b) certain insurance
policies in the case were governed by the law of the foreign forum
and one of the defendants was incorporated there, and (c) the foreign action had been filed nearly a year before the domestic action.206 Aside from scattershot reference to this amalgam of factors,
however, the court offered no explanation for why these particular
facts, out of all others in the case, were relevant, nor what weight
the district court either had or should have given to these facts,
nor, indeed, what the Eleventh Circuit believed "international
comity" to be in the first place. 20 7 Other examples from other
courts 208 provide equally unappealing instances of such ad hoc de-

204

Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994).
Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 1999).

205

Id.

203

Id. at 1224.
In Seguros del Estado, S.A. v. Scientific Games, Inc., 262 F.3d 1164, 1170 (11th
Cir. 2001), the court did at least indicate that in order for its "international abstention" approach to apply it must be shown as a threshold matter that the proceedings in the foreign and domestic courts are parallel.
208 See, e.g., Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1993); Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int'l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Caspian Investments Ltd. v. Vicon Holdings Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
206
207
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cision-making, 209 offering almost unfettered discretion to the district courts and no real guidance as to how that discretion should
be properly exercised.
In addition to ad hoc decision-making, courts that have relied
on the Court's decision in Landis have also not been consistent in
their disposition of cases in which it is believed that deference
should be given to a foreign parallel proceeding. Some courts, reacting to the Court's decision in Quackenbush, have concluded that
a stay is the appropriate manner in which deference should be exercised. 210 Others continue to issue dismissals where there is a for-

Brinco Mining Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1982).
209 One final note should be made of two classes of decisions in which the
courts have purported to invoke principles of "international comity," but seem to
have misunderstood their applicability in foreign lis alibi pendens cases. In one
group of cases, a number of U.S. courts have taken the view that principles of
comity are not applicable unless and until the foreign proceeding has resulted in a
final judgment. Citing the Supreme Court's definition of comity in Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 95 (1895), these courts have held that comity is applicable only "to
another sovereign's definite law or judicial decision," and not to a pending foreign action. Dragon Capital Partners L.P. v. Merrill Lynch Capital Servs. Inc., 949
F. Supp 1123, 1127 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). As we have seen, however, the history of
comity's development in the common law, together with the overwhelming
weight of case law, simply does not support this view. Principles of comity have
been applied frequently by courts in the U.S. and England in a myriad of situations which do not concern deference to legislative acts or judicial decisions of
foreign sovereigns, including, most importantly, cases of foreign lis alibi pendens.
Other courts have made a different error by concluding that there is no role for
comity in the context of a pending foreign lis. For these courts, the supposed inapplicability of principles of comity has lead to the embrace of a mistaken "rule"
that parallel cases in the courts of two different sovereigns should "ordinarily"
proceed concurrently. See, e.g., Goldhammer v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 59 F. Supp.
2d 248 (D. Mass. 1999); Nycal Corp. v. Inoco PLC, 968 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). The foundation of the error that these courts make is their uncritical reliance on case law developed in the context of anti-suit injunctions, where the
proposition- against issuing an injunction against a foreign proceeding- is that
"parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously." Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This is a disturbing trend because the
reasoning of these anti-suit injunction cases is not readily transplantable to cases
involving a stay by the domestic court. Indeed, as Judge Wilkey rightly observed
in the Laker Airways case, "[c]omity varies according to the factual circumstances
surrounding each claim for its recognition." 731 F.2d at 937. The requirements of
comity are simply different in the two classes of cases. See discussion supra Section 2.3. For a more detailed analysis of the issues raised by anti-suit injunctions
in the United States and England, see for example, Anderson, supra note 2; Swanson, supra note 2; Bermann, supra note 26.
210 See, e.g., Goldhammer, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 252 (staying case).
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eign lis alibi pendens.211 The application of common law principles
of adjudicatory comity, however, indicates that only one course is
appropriate: the stay.2 12 Not only is this a fundamental, if somewhat arbitrary, distinction between the common law plea of
abatement and the common law application of adjudicatory comity, 213 but, as we have seen above, there are practical reasons why a
domestic court should maintain a jurisdictional connection to the
action in the event that the foreign proceedings prove unable to se214
cure a just and timely resolution of the dispute.
5.3. Recent Second Circuit Dicta: A Suggestion of a Historically
and DoctrinallyAdequate Basis for Discretion in Parallel
Proceedings Cases
Only one court seems to have suggested a historically and doctrinally adequate explanation for the discretionary power of a federal court to decline or limit the exercise of jurisdiction in an international lis alibi pendens case. In Diorinou v. Metzitis, the Second
Circuit observed that when a court exercises jurisdictional discretion under principles of adjudicatory comity, it is "invoking a doctrine akin to forum non conveniens."215 By this statement, although
the court did not elaborate, the Second Circuit appears to be acknowledging that the power of a federal court to defer its exercise
of jurisdiction to a foreign lis alibi pendens is a matter of discretionary power rooted in traditional common law principles of adjudicatory comity, "akin to the doctrine of forum non conveniens." If this
is indeed what the Second Circuit is getting after, it would not only
be fully consistent with the historical development of adjudicatory
comity within the common law, but it would also represent a significant statement regarding the constitutional authority for federal
jurisdictional discretion in international lis alibipendens cases.
There are sound reasons for identifying the pedigree of the federal courts' discretionary power in international lis alibi pendens
cases with the doctrine of forum non conveniens and not with the
211 See, e.g., Paraschos v. YBM Magnex Int'l, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (issuing dismissal where action existed in Canadian court).
212 See supra Section 2.4.
213 See supra Section 3.
214 See supra Section 2.4.
215 Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2001).
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domestic abstention doctrines. In the first place, unlike the Supreme Court's domestic abstention jurisprudence, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens has developed-and indeed today only applies- in international cases in which the domestic court is asked
to defer to proceedings in a foreign forum. As we have seen, at the
foundations of that development are traditional principles of
common law adjudicatory comity, which from the first were conceived to address international cases. In contrast, the domestic abstention doctrines ever and always have been creatures of the federal-state arrangements, designed to operate with specific attention
to the issues raised in the peculiar context of the U.S. system of
federal government. Thus, the Supreme Court appropriately has
emphasized that its domestic abstention doctrines and the doctrine
of forum non conveniens are cut from different doctrinal cloth and
that the principles and presumptions at work in the two classes of
216
cases are not transferable.
Moreover, the doctrinal placement of the authority for the exercise of discretion in lis alibi pendens cases is consistent with the Supreme Court's classification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
in American Dredging Co. v. Miller217 as a "federal common-law
venue rule" that allows a federal district court in international
cases the discretion to "determin[e] which among various competent courts will decide the case." 218 Adjudicatory comity in foreign
lis alibi pendens cases functions much to the same effect. As the
cases from the states indicate, principles of adjudicatory comity
empower the courts to exercise discretion to determine where a
case should best be heard where parallel actions are pending in different countries. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in both England and
Canada, the courts have not seen the need to develop, as the U.S.
state courts have, an independent theory for applying adjudicatory
comity to foreign lis alibi pendens cases, but instead have found it
sufficient simply to recalibrate the doctrine of forum non conveniens

216 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721-23 (1996). Cf. Stephen
Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of the Millenium?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 111, 120 (1999) (noting that in Quackenbush the
Court recognized forum non conveniens as "discrete").
217 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
218 Id. at 453.
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in such cases to meet the special factual conditions raised by the ex219
istence of an earlier-filed parallel case.
Although this Article does not propose that the doctrine of forum non conveniens as such should be applied by the federal courts
to address cases of earlier-filed international parallel proceedings,
as the development of the doctrine in England and Canada suggests, in principle there is no reason why the framework used to
apply forum non conveniens in the United States could not be modified to accommodate the unique factual circumstances and issues
present in such cases. In a sense, the question is really one of practicality and vocabulary and not a distinct doctrinal source of power
or legitimacy. 220 Fifty years on from the Court's decision in Gilbert
v. Gulf Oil, the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the United States,
with its attendant presumptions against displacing the domestic
forum, is probably most comfortable in its current role in the
United States addressing cases in which the foreign action has not
yet been filed (or has been filed later).
Indeed, the relatively few cases applying the U.S. forum non
conveniens doctrine in cases of a prior-pending foreign action reveal
a variety of unsatisfactory results. Some courts have essentially ignored the existence of the foreign lis in conducting their analysis,
obviously missing the fundamental point that the manner of application of principles of adjudicatory comity depends upon the factual circumstances of the case at hand. One approach does not fit
every case. 221 Other courts, by contrast, have only considered the
219 See, e.g., The Abidin Daver, [19841 A.C. 398, 411 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (Lord Diplock); Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [19871 A.C. 460,
476 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Goff); de Dampierre v. de Dampierre,
[1988] A.C. 92, 108 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); 472900 B.C. Ltd. v. Thrift Canada Ltd., [1999] 6 W.W.R. 4416 (Can.) (providing examples of where Canadian
and English courts have used forum non conveniens to decide whether to stay an
action when a parallel case existed in another court).
220 Cf. Owens Bank Ltd. v. Bracco, [1992] 2 A.C. 443 (Ct. App.) ("[T]he Latin
tags 'forum non conveniens' and 'lis
alibi pendens'... are no more than convenient
tags to describe particular fields in which the general principle, the prevention of
injustice, may be applicable."), affd, [19921 2 A.C. 443 (Eng. H.L.).
221 See Biblical Archaeology Soc'y, No. 92-5590, 1993 WL 39572 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
10, 1993) (finding principles of comity inapplicable to a pending case in a foreign
alibi pendens within the forum non convencourt and according no weight to the lis
iens analysis); Cliffs-Neddrill Turnkey Int'l-Oranjestad v. M/T Rich Duke, 734 F.
Supp. 142 (D. Del. 1990) (finding that public interest favors the alternative forum);
Reavis v. Gulf Oil Co., 85 F.R.D. 666 (D. Del. 1980) (rejecting dismissal of action
underforum non conveniens analysis).
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presence of a pending foreign action in terms of the foreign forum's availability and adequacy under the Gilbert test. 222 These
cases also fail to recognize that the presence of an earlier-filed foreign action, as opposed to a merely prospective foreign action (or
action filed subsequent to the domestic action), means that the
principles of adjudicatory comity apply differently and, accordingly, the presumptions applicable in the two kinds of cases should
not be the same. Similarly, a number of courts have found that a
pending foreign lis is relevant to the "private interest" factors of
the forum non conveniens analysis, particularly the burden of litigating concurrently in two fora, but, here again, these cases have
failed to understand that the dynamic principles of adjudicatory
comity require an analysis that is tailored to the kind of case before
the court and not simply transplanted from a related, yet distinct,
22 3
type of case.
The confusion exemplified by these cases suggests that it is
probably too late in the day for a comprehensive treatment of foreign lis alibi pendens cases under the rubric of federalforum non conveniens. There is too much baggage associated with the Court's
discussions of forum non conveniens in the context of prospective actions in cases like Gilbert and Reyno to make it likely that, in the absence of direct Supreme Court guidance, the federal courts will
draw the kind of distinctions in analysis that the unique circumstances of an earlier-filed foreign action requires. In a sense this is
unfortunate because, as this Article has shown, the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the application of principles of adjudicatory comity to cases of prior-pending foreign proceedings are cut
from the same common law doctrinal cloth. As a result, even
though one may not wish to apply the term forum non conveniens to
a court's application of principles of adjudicatory comity in a case
of a prior-pending foreign parallel proceeding, in essence one

m See, e.g., Banco Latino v. Gomez Lopez, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (pendency of proceeding in Venezuela "lends further support to the adequacy of the Venezuelan forum").
223 See, e.g., Creative Tech, Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696,703 (9th
Cir. 1995); Wong v. United Airlines, No. 99-1441, 2001 WL 30192 (E.D. La. Jan. 10,
2001); B.C.C.I. Holdings (Lux.) S.A. v. Mahfouz, 828 F. Supp. 92, 98 (D.D.C. 1993);
see also M&I Eastpoint Tech., Inc. v. Mid-Med Bank, No. 99-411-JD, 2000 WL
1466150 at *9 (D.N.H. Jan. 28, 2000) (parallel pending proceeding in Malta relevant
to "public interest" factor of adjudicating case with economy of judicial resources).
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should consider that the recognition of the legitimacy of the doctrine of forum non conveniens generally in the United States serves
as a tacit recognition of the legitimacy of judicial discretion to apply principles of adjudicatory comity in appropriate international
parallel proceedings cases because the distinction between the application of adjudicatory comity in a U.S. forum non conveniens case,
and a prior-pending foreign lis alibi pendens case is really only
about the presumptions that should apply to the distinct factual
circumstances of the two kinds of cases. It is hoped that this is
what the Second Circuit means when it identifies a "kinship" between applications of adjudicatory comity in cases of foreign lis al224
ibi pendens and cases of forum non conveniens.
6. A PROPOSAL FOR TREATING FOREIGN Lis ALIBI PENDENS CASES
UNDER COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATORY COMITY

As has been noted throughout, the application of principles of
"[c]omity varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each claim for its recognition." 225 Thus, we have seen above
that in cases of foreign judgment enforcement, the common law
embraces a preference for the enforcement of foreign judgments
that results in a presumptive limitation on the domestic court's exercise of its jurisdiction. Rather than have the domestic court exercise the full measure of its jurisdiction and hear the merits of the
parties' dispute, the courts act by principles of adjudicatory comity
to create a presumption that the foreign judgment should be enforced unless the party challenging that enforcement is able to

224 In another sense, the development of the forum non conveniens as a framework that has become so closely associated with cases of prospective foreign litigation is ironic. An early application of forum non conveniens, often cited by the
Supreme Court, Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., was itself a case involving
a lis alibi pendens in the Admiralty Court of Canada. 285 U.S. 413 (1932). Notably,
in the district court's decision in that case, which the Court duly affirmed, a substantial consideration in favor of declining jurisdiction was the existence of the
parallel Canadian action and the concern that if the two actions were allowed to
proceed "the Canadian Court of Admiralty [might] determine liability one way,
and this court another way." Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 49 F.2d
802, 804 (D.C.N.Y. 1930). The district court speculated that "[s]uch antagonistic
determinations might lead to a multiplicity of actions to determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties -something that should be avoided." Id. This represents
a missed opportunity, perhaps.
22
Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). See, supra text accompanying note 147.
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show that to do so would violate certain specified interests of the
domestic forum. 226 Conversely, in cases involving the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, the common law adjusts the application of
adjudicatory comity and shifts its presumption in favor of the
plaintiff who has established the domestic court's jurisdiction and
venue, either in the absence of any proceeding in a foreign forum
or where the foreign action is later-filed. 227 Thus, the domestic
plaintiff should rarely have his or her choice of forum disturbed,
unless upon a balance of identified interests, the domestic court
concludes that the in the interests of justice the action should be
228
tried in an adequate alternative foreign forum.
What these cases of foreign judgment enforcement and forum
non conveniens tell us about cases of lis alibi pendens is that when the
issue is the application of adjudicatory comity, one size does not fit
all. The presumptions that are appropriate in one class of cases involving the application of adjudicatory comity are not necessarily
appropriate in another. Instead, what the courts must do for each
class of cases in which adjudicatory comity is implicated is to craft
rules derived from the principles underlying adjudicatory comity,
such as the goal of doing justice in individual cases and the desireability of promoting efficient adjudication of transnational disputes
by preventing unnecessary litigation, the possibility of conflicting
judgments, and unseemly controversy between the courts of different sovereigns. We have seen that principles of adjudicatory
comity provide a basis for the exercise of jurisdictional discretion
by the federal courts; it remains to determine how such principles
should be crafted into rules that are tailored to the factual circumstances raised.
6.1. A Presumptionfor First-FiledCases
This Article proposes that in exercising jurisdictional discretion
based upon principles of adjudicatory comity, a U.S. federal court
should ordinarily defer through the issuance of a stay to proceedings taking place in foreign countries in cases in which: (1) the foreign action was filed first; (2) the foreign action involves substan-

See discussion supra Section 4.3.
See discussion infra Section 6.2.
228 See id.
226
227
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tially the same parties and issues as the U.S. action such that res
judicata would apply between the two; and (3) the foreign court is
able to provide adequate relief on the parties' claims. Once the
moving party has made such a preliminary showing, the burden
should shift to the non-moving party (i.e., the proponent of a the
federal forum) to show that there are particular reasons that should
cause the trial court not to exercise its discretion in favor of a stay
but instead to exercise its full measure of jurisdiction to hear the
case on its merits. In considering what kinds of reasons might persuade a domestic court not to stay its own proceedings in.deference to a prior-filed foreign lis alibi pendens, the trial courts should
look to see whether there are special circumstances present that
undercut the goals behind principles of adjudicatory comity. That
is, the courts should look to see whether the circumstances of the
case suggest that deference to the forum court would violate domestic public policy, prejudice the rights of those entitled to the
protection of U.S. law, or whether the facts indicate that the foreign
action was contrived to usurp the "natural" plaintiff's choice of forum by bringing a preemptive claim for a declaration of nonliability.
Application of the rule proposed above is in keeping with virtually every common law court that has considered the issueindeed, it is heavily based upon the approach taken by the New
Jersey courts. Its adoption as a standard in the federal courts in exercising their comity-based discretion would have a number of
beneficial effects. First, it would allow the federal courts to avoid
the "recipe for confusion and injustice" 229 created by allowing concurrent parallel actions. That is, it would reduce to a minimum the
number of cases in which international cases proceeded concur230
rently, thereby eliminating the potential for conflicting decisions
and discouraging an unseemly race to be the first to obtain judgment in the respective litigants' chosen fora. 231 Second, it would
also serve to prevent unnecessary, and potentially vexatious and
229

The Abidin Daver, [1984] 1 A.C. 398, 410 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)

(U.K.).
See, e.g., Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int'l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101,
104 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (illustrating where domestic court granted stay of action to
allow foreign litigation to proceed in order to reduce conflicts).
231 See, e.g., Sauter v. Sauter, 495 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (providing an example of where the court ruled that despite the existence of two actions, both could continue and one would not be dismissed).
230
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harassing, litigation, which carries with it increased costs and inconvenience to the parties and courts involved 232 and invites litigation by attrition. Finally, application of a first-filed presumption
would give structure and guidance to courts that are faced with
applying their comity-based discretion and curb the potential for
the ad hoc decision-making that has plagued the decisions of the
federal courts which have already concluded that they have significant discretion to stay foreign lis alibi pendens cases. In so doing,
it would respond to Shapiro's concern that the exercise of jurisdictional discretion by the federal courts must be "capable of being articulated and openly applied ...evaluated by critics of the courts'
work, and reviewed by the legislative branch" if it is to exist within
a regime of law. 233
Although the relative simplicity and clarity of a rule incorporating a first-filed presumption with a shifting burden of proof and
specific factors for consideration would do much to give order and
predictability to the exercise of judicial discretion in cases of foreign lis alibi pendens, even within this framework there are questions to be answered by the court: Was the foreign action filed
first? Are the parties and issues substantially similar such that res
judicata would apply? Is the litigation in the foreign forum capable of providing adequate relief on the parties' claims? The need to
address such threshold questions, however, should not counsel
against the adoption of the rule. These are the kinds of questions
that we ask courts to resolve in many kinds of cases and the need
to address them at a preliminary stage seems a small price to pay
for an approach to international prior-pending proceedings that reflects an overarching goal of achieving the efficient and equitable
adjudication of individual cases.
Moreover, with regard to the issues that may arise from a nonmoving party's assertions that there are special circumstances that
militate in favor of the domestic court's retention of jurisdiction,
here again, the issues raised are not unlike those raised in the
analyses applied by the federal courts in other kinds of cases.
Thus, for example, when a court is asked to determine in a lis alibi
232 See, e.g., Efco Corp. v. Aluma Sys., USA, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 816, 824 (S.D.
Iowa 1997); The Abidin Daver, [1984] A.C. at 398. ("[I]t must be more expensive to
litigate about liability for the same collision in two jurisdictions than it would be
to litigate in one alone.").
233 Shapiro, supra note 4, at 578.
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pendens stay analysis whether deference to the foreign court would
violate domestic public policy, it is answering a question that we
ask courts to answer in other fields as well. That is not to say that
it will be easy in every case to decide these issues; the experience
with traditional forum non conveniens cases suggests that there will
be hard issues, such as the weight to be given to the presence of a
federal claim.2 34 Nevertheless, given that a decision to defer or not
to defer can mean the difference between a litigation occurring
once or twice in different fora around the world, any burden borne
by the parties or the courts in resolving these threshold issues
would seem to be outweighed by the far greater burden of letting
unnecessary actions proceed concurrently.
6.2. Treating ParallelProceedings Where the ForeignAction is not
First-Filed
Any proposal to adopt a presumption in favor of first-filed foreign parallel proceedings prompts another question: What of the
situation in which it is the domestic action that is first-filed, but yet
it appears to the court that in the interests of justice the matter
should be more appropriately decided in the courts of another
country? Here it seems that there may be no need for the courts to
recognize a new approach because the law as it currently stands
can address these matters through the doctrine of forum non conveniens and through the discretionary power of the federal courts to
deny declaratory relief.
We adopt a presumption in favor of earlier-filed foreign actions
because we presume that if the later-filed domestic action is essentially duplicative then there is no reason why the later court should
entertain such a case. Where the domestic action, however, is not
the later-filed, and it is the foreign action which appears merely
duplicative, the basis for such a presumption disappears, although
the reasons for deference might not. Litigation in the foreign forum, for example, even though later-filed, may still appear to be
the more appropriate under traditional forum non conveniens analysis. Moreover, the earlier-filed U.S. action might seek a negative
declaration and appear to have been filed for little reason other
than to try to usurp the natural plaintiff's choice of forum in which
Lonny S. Hoffman & Keith A. Rowley, Forum Non Conveniens in Federal
Statutory Cases, 49 EMORY L.J. 1137 (2000).
234
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case, again, the domestic court may find grounds to exercise its
admitted discretion under the established rules addressing the issuance of such relief. 235 In either situation, even though the U.S. action has been first filed, the court retains the discretion to address
the foreign parallel proceeding in a way that is guided by a framework of analysis that reflects -but is not mechanically bound by the presumptions appropriate to the general factual situation at
hand.
7. CONCLUSION
The treatment of international parallel proceedings remains
one of the most unsettled areas of the law of federal jurisdiction in
the United States. Short of attention by the Supreme Court, a consensus among the federal courts may never emerge. In this Article,
I have tried to look at the problem of international parallel proceedings as part of a historical continuum of situations in which
U.S. courts have been called upon to address proceedings in the
courts of foreign sovereigns. In so doing, I have argued that the
key to developing a constitutionally coherent and practicably
workable analytical approach to the relatively modern problem of
international parallel proceedings lies in the application of principles of adjudicatory comity that have been a part of the common
law for over two hundred years. Under those principles, the federal courts possess the discretionary power to limit the exercise of
their jurisdiction in appropriate cases in deference to the courts of a
foreign sovereign. Much like the rules governing the enforcement
of foreign judgments or the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, such an exercise of discretion does not constitute an abdication by the federal courts of their obligation to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon them by Congress, but instead reflects
the common law background against which the jurisdictional statutes were enacted. As such, while the considerations of federalism
and our constitutional form of government that are appropriate in
235 See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 346 F.3d 357, 359-60 (2d Cir.
2003) (affirming district court's decision of earlier-filed domestic action for negative declaratory relief in deference to pending action for libel in England); see also
Nw. Airlines v. Am. Airlines, 989 F.2d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting similar
concerns in context of issuing an anti-suit injunction); First Midwest Corp. v. Corporate Fin. Assoc., 663 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Iowa 2003) (noting that preemptive filing
of a negative declaratory action may counsel in favor of the dismissal of an action
for declaratory relief in favor of a later-filed action).
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the federal-state context may dictate one kind of approach to domestic parallel proceedings, in international cases, where those interests are absent, common law principles of adjudicatory comity
dictate a different approach. Thus, I have argued that a distinct
analytical framework for international cases needs to be created in
the federal courts and that such a framework should include a presumption in favor of deferring to earlier-filed foreign actions
unless special circumstances can be shown for why the federal
court should retain jurisdiction. In so doing, I hope that this Article may at least be the start of a larger debate on the proper modalities for the exercise of the federal courts' discretion.
Moreover, the adoption of a presumption in favor of earlierfiled foreign parallel proceedings would have the salutary effect of
harmonizing the treatment of comity-based stay cases with the
treatment of requests for anti-suit injunctions. In an anti-suit injunction case a domestic court is asked to enjoin legal proceedings
in the courts of a sovereign foreign nation. In that scenario, many
courts in the United States have recognized that the injunction necessarily interferes with the jurisdiction of the foreign court and
raises issues of comity. 236 As a result, for many U.S. courts the
general rule is that principles of comity require a presumption that
the U.S. court should not issue the injunction interfering with the
foreign court's jurisdiction and should allowing the domestic and
the foreign actions to proceed concurrently, unless exceptional circumstances are shown. 23 7 In a comity-stay case, by contrast, because of the unique procedural posture of the case before the court
the implications of applying comity are completely different-yet
238 There, the matter before the U.S.
the goals remain the same.
court is an affirmative request to extend comity to the proceedings
See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
237 See Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d
11, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing competing federal approaches).
238 See Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1202 (2d Cir.
1970) ("[W]e can see no reason why the end result should be different when the
party seeking to preserve the primacy of the first court moves the second court to
stay its hand rather than asking the first court to enjoin prosecution of the second
case. Whatever the procedure, the first suit should have priority, 'absent the
showing of balance of convenience in favor of the second action.'") (citations
omitted); cf. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] A.C.
871, 892-94 (P.C.) (appeal from Brunei) (noting the different applications of principles inforum non conveniens cases and anti-suit injunction cases).
236
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in the foreign court. By adopting both a presumption in favor of
deferring to the earlier-filed foreign action in comity-stay cases and
a presumption against interfering with the foreign proceedings in
anti-suit injunction cases, the federal courts will begin to create
some symmetry and harmony in their treatment of international
parallel proceedings.
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